

Peter Hitchcock

CHRONOTOPE OF THE SHOE (TWO) [2003]

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This final piece of writing (Peter Hitchcock's 'Chronotope of the Shoe (Two)') returns us to the topic of the first one in this collection: the commodity and its secret. In contemporary culture, casual athletic shoes (trainers or sneakers) have become a distinctive commodity that also, to a large degree, seems to epitomise commodification itself. As Hitchcock shows, the various companies that make sneakers (Nike, Reebok, Adidas, Puma, Lacoste and so on) outsource the production of shoes to workers in 'developing' countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia where labour can be bought for very little money. The shoes are then sold in 'over-developed' countries for a great deal of money. This disparity is hidden in the shoe and by the shoe, which is transformed (through design and promotion) into a magical product that is highly desirable, fashionable and, for some, collectable. The sneaker is produced in thousands of different styles, and these styles are attached to various logos and brand names that anchor them. The sneaker, then, also demonstrates the way that the 'distinctiveness, difference and newness' of a particular commodity (which is often all you are really paying for) is only a minor derivation of the surface design while the functional structure remains constant.

For his inquiry into the sneaker commodity Hitchcock uses the concept of the 'chronotope'. He takes the term from the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin's translators explain the chronotope as: 'A unit of analysis for studying texts according to the ratio and nature of temporal and spatial categories represented. . . . The chronotope is an optic for reading texts as x-rays of the forces at work in the culture system from which they spring' (Emerson and Holquist in Bakhtin 1981: 425–6). For Bakhtin 'the chronotope makes narrative events concrete, makes them take on flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins' (Bakhtin 1981: 250). Thus it is the most social aspect of a literary text, and the one that is played out across its form and content. If a narrative is made up of a series of events, then the chronotope of literature is the orchestration of time and space (for instance, in the picaresque novel, the road movie and so on) that allows events to be 'shown forth' in a particular way.

While Bakhtin concentrates on literature, the concept of the chronotope shouldn't be limited to narrative forms. In Bakhtin's hands the chronotope opens up literature to the historical geography of the real world. For Hitchcock the chronotope is the critical antidote to the fetish of the commodity. The attention to the chronotope of the shoe is a way of insisting that what is hidden by the

commodity (the real history of the production, the geographical unevenness of its circulation) is inscribed in the shoe in physical form. The chronotope is what allows Hitchcock to follow 'the trace of a Jakarta woman shoe worker in a rubber sole and, as we will see, a working-class African American male dead in the streets of Chicago with his shoes removed'.

Further reading: Abbas and Erni 2005; Bakhtin 1981; Goldman and Papson 1999.

[. . .]

KARL MARX ONCE suggested that a commodity "is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties."¹ A social history of the shoe would show as much, for there is no commodity in modern history with a greater capacity to confound thingness and spirit, use value and exchange, desire and displacement, and production with consumption.² The commodity stands in for Being where Being itself threatens the logic of the commodity form. The shoes (pairs, hence the "two" of my title) deconstruct the binaries that bind while yet confirming the convenience of their duality (the commodity status of shoes makes their use and their function as objects of desire both separable or collapsible within a marketing machine). Rather than elaborate the social history implied above, I want to examine in more detail the contemporary chronotope that links culture and capital in the aura of the shoe. In the manner of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, one could state that the aura of the shoe spreads, rhizomelike, across the globe as an (almost) metaphysical index of desire in capital (indeed, to be "over the shoes" is an expression of desire). But while this allows an understanding of the theological and theoretical inside/outside of the shoe it does not coordinate the affective points of responsibility that historically have left the trace of a Jakarta woman shoe worker in a rubber sole and, as we will see, a working-class African American male dead in the streets of Chicago with his shoes removed.

To chart this chronotope I will elaborate the *pointure* (as Derrida describes it) or pricking of the shoe in theory, and the rise of a particular commodity, the athletic shoe. The aim throughout will be to map the "metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties" of commodity culture as it currently confers aphanisis on the workers of the world (even when, or precisely because, the workers are positioned between the earth and the people who use them³). I have three claims that are central to commodity critique: first, a materialist understanding of transnational capitalist commodification is not simply a problem of totality, but one of imagination;⁴ second (but a point that is, in essence, inextricable from the first), time/space compression in transnational commodity culture offers an abstruse simultaneity that necessitates a reevaluation of the fetish and fetishism;⁵ third, commodity desire is no more inevitable than responsibility — both desire and responsibility are produced within regimes of truth that are irreconcilable — their contradictions are themselves an index of the world system.

The chronotope of the shoe invokes a Bakhtinian framework of affective responsibility — a means to fathom the logic of the commodity.⁶ In Bakhtin's interpretation, the chronotope was multivalent, a complex constituent feature of his developing "historical poetics" that could link recurring literary devices across cultural history.⁷ Yet this immediately marks Bakhtin's chronotope as a contradictory concept. If, as Bakhtin argues, literary chronotopes develop from and respond to specific extraliterary contexts, then how can these chronotopes be manifest transhistorically? Michael Holquist suggests that we distinguish between chronotope as a device or category of narrative and the principle of chronotopicity itself. The latter refers to time/space relations that structure the always already mediated condition of art and life.⁸ As Bakhtin notes, "Out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and *created* chronotopes of the world represented in the work."⁹ While chronotopicity is not a stable bridge between art and life, it nevertheless draws attention to the mediatory functions of time and space in their interrelation. Beside its transhistorical inclinations, however, there are other obvious weaknesses in Bakhtin's articulation of the concept. For instance, the concrete forms of everyday life that Bakhtin

summons draw attention to the situatedness of *his* critique from which one must ask what it would mean to specify "the actual chronotopes of our world." Would one not be forced, by the very terms of Bakhtin's exegesis, to particularize quite radically what is "ours" in that phrase? And what are the processes by which "our" world gets generalized so that in a chronotopic economy "our" world might stand in for others? Again, one must distinguish quite carefully the "worldliness" that Bakhtin advocates, despite and because of its correlations with the transnationalism of the commodity form. My point is this: If, as Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist contend, the chronotope is "a concept for engaging reality,"¹⁰ then we would do well to examine the chronotopes of that world and not just their artistic or literary correlatives *in isolation* that are the hallmarks, for better or worse, of the "world" about which Bakhtin wrote in "Forms of Time."

When we are in life we are not in art and vice versa, as Bakhtin muses. But of course, chronotope, like dialogism and exotopy, is a Bakhtinian bridging concept that links these autonomous yet interdependent worlds: "However forcefully the real and represented world resist fusion . . . they are nevertheless indissolubly tied up with each other and find themselves in continual mutual interaction; uninterrupted exchange goes on between them, similar to the uninterrupted exchange of matter between living organisms and the environment that surrounds them."¹¹ Bakhtin is recalling the thought of Alexander Ukhtomsky from whom he first heard and used the word *chronotope* in 1925. There is little use in substituting directly these comments on uninterrupted exchange with the production of value in exchange represented by the commodity form. Can they be coordinated or tied up within cultural critique, however, without losing the specificity of either? And, if the aura of the shoe, the athletic shoe in particular, is enabled by what Fredric Jameson calls the cultural logic of late capitalism¹² – indeed, is symptomatic of its transnationalism – can these terms be interrelated without inexorably reproducing the inclusionary fantasy of worldliness that most transnational corporations (TNCs) tout as the very integer of their success?

Here, the chronotope is a story of a shoe and the worker to which it refers. The invocation of the shoe, however, does not build a world picture of culture and capital at the present time (for representation itself will remain the problem and not the provider) yet it can implicate cultural critique in the fate of the increasingly absent or disappearing worker whose labor "disappears" in the commodity form but now also vanishes in the commodification of theory itself. The strategy I recommend is not only to inscribe the shoe within a metonymic chain of affective being, but also to elaborate the shoe within a code of affective answerability. The shifting registers of the symbolic of the shoe are less about the capabilities of the cultural researcher than about the abject culpability of the Same. The aim is not the production of guilt (however some may revel in the discourse of victimhood); rather, I seek the production of a counterlogic, one which challenges the tidy knowledge that the trail of the shoe might leave. Cultural critique cannot (following Gayatri Spivak's powerfully argued notion)¹³ make the subaltern (Indonesian shoe worker) speak, but it can attend to a geopolitical imagination that challenges the production of that "existence" on a world scale.

The shoe is magical, both within the history of the commodity and the psychological compulsions of modern "man." The shoe is *the* emblem of the fetishism that links the commodity to desire. And the most magical shoe of all is currently the athletic shoe because it is simultaneously a symbol of cultural capital, physical prowess, self-esteem, economic and psychic overinvestment, and crass economic exploitation; in fact, it epitomizes late capitalist flexible accumulation *and* continuing masculinist regimes of desire and disavowal.¹⁴ Although Donald Katz has a different argument in mind, he stated the case quite nicely in 1994: "The name-brand athletic shoe might seem an unlikely seminal artifact of these last years of the twentieth century, but that is clearly what the shoes have become."¹⁵ One brand in particular demonstrates the aura of the shoe for Katz, and that is Nike – named after the Greek goddess of victory, and a company that marks the triumphalism of transnational corporate élan.¹⁶ This "seminal artifact" conjures the chronotope that is our chief concern and runs from the culture of consumption to the international division of labor and the critical methods that must be answerable to both.

What is the magic of capital for late capitalism? In 1962 Phil Knight "faked out" a Japanese athletic shoe company and became their distributor in the United States under the name Blue Ribbon Sports. Ten

years later Jeff Johnson, an employee of Blue Ribbon Sports, sat bolt upright in his bed one morning and blurted the word, "Nike." Phil Knight was looking for a new moniker for the company and its sports shoes. Within thirty years the name of the winged goddess of victory became synonymous with the success of American transnationalism in recreational footwear, enough, for instance, to produce nearly \$10 billion of annual sales and profits of \$800 million in 1997 alone (a year in which Nike sold more than three hundred pairs of shoes a minute).¹⁷ But Nike has also faced severe problems in its form of globalization. With the economic downturn in Asia in 1997–98, changes in fashion demand, classic overproduction caused by its contract futures, financial and social instability in its main production hubs like Indonesia, and burgeoning opposition in Asia and in Nike's "homeland" to transnational sweatshop practices, Nike saw its profits drop by 35 percent in the first quarter of 1998; indeed, in the second quarter of that year it reported a net loss of \$67.6 million – a disaster quickly followed by layoffs and public-relations campaigns. It has since recovered, but it is clearly subject to intense competition/opposition at home and abroad. Despite these shifting fortunes and the emergence of a formidable antiglobalist and anti-World Trade Organization network, the story of Nike has become a legend in American capitalist history, a lesson in tremendous company growth and a benchmark for savvy marketing tactics. To underline the latter, one should note that Nike is not really in the business of making shoes: What it does is market shoes. The shoes themselves are made through contracting and subcontracting in twelve- to eighteen-month production cycles outside its major market, the United States. Currently, Nike uses more than 700 factories worldwide that employ more than 500,000 people (110,000 in Indonesia).¹⁸ It is the metaphysical subtleties of the shoe that Nike has harnessed with a godlike touch that few have matched. Yet who is vanquished in Nike's "victory," and what other rendezvous of victory is possible in the nexus of culture and capital?

The chronotope of the shoe immediately invites questions of desire (the projection of the fetish and its disavowal) that are more than a subtheme: They describe both the limits of a geopolitical cultural transnationalism and the geopolitical in general at this historical juncture. Thus, the worker "exists" at the nexus of economic integration, spatial differentiation, cultural globalization, *and* masculinist disavowal. While the notion of existence as aphanisis follows Marx's analysis of the commodity to a certain degree, it also links the fate of the worker in contemporary forms of engendered power. The financialization and transnationalization of the globe is partial (despite the triumphalism that its proponents proclaim) but significant enough to throw into relief the patriarchal and capitalist ideologies that inform its mode of accumulation. These must insistently be made answerable to the being of the worker, however decentered that self has become. The task is not to make visible that which has been transmogrified beyond recognition (for that visibility is also often at man's behest): The point is to understand the contemporary processes (psychic, social, economic, political) by which workers must be rendered a convenient abstraction – the shoe for the flesh.¹⁹

Nike makes shoes in Indonesia.²⁰ Indonesia is a country that needs no "national allegory" to understand its integration into global capitalist and cultural relations. (Here I agree with Aijaz Ahmad's cogent critique that Jameson's characterization of the "Third World" text is an exercise in "positivist reductionism."²¹) Indonesia's contemporary ties to the world system begin in 1965, first with a military coup, then with the overthrow of Sukarno and his populist regime, and the subsequent crushing of the Communist Party (PKI) by the Western-backed forces of Suharto.²² Suharto's "New Order" meant several things: a political system that continually steamrollered any and all forms of opposition to its "beneficence" (what was left of the PKI was outlawed in 1966, and periodic social unrest, like the riots of 1984 were quickly "remedied"); a foreign policy that has not been beyond a little old-style colonialism to maintain hegemony in the Indonesian archipelago (the process of incorporating East Timor cost several hundred thousand lives, but in the aftermath of Suharto's "withdrawal" from the political scene and an East Timorese independence movement sanctioned first by Suharto's "interim" successor, B. J. Habibie, then Wahid, and most recently Megawati Sukarnoputri, that bloody annexation is being remedied to some degree²³); an enforcement of constitutional rule that often meant a narrow interpretation of the *Pancasila* (the Five Principles originally devised by Sukarno as a basis for the modern Indonesian state²⁴); and an opening to foreign investment that undoubtedly raised living standards in many sections of the population but did not fundamentally

address the root causes of systemic inequalities that attract transnational corporations in the first place. Development in Indonesia has meant this and more.

The periodic World Bank country reports on Indonesia make for dry and clinical reading.²⁵ The studies appear to have been prodded by the typical traumatic stress associated with massive foreign investment and the exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources (including large oil reserves, a factor that has clearly spurred growth but, because of the geopolitical significance of oil prices, has often meant internationally produced austerity programs – and strategic silence on state-sponsored atrocities). The piles of statistics on poverty rates in Indonesia are a measure of the World Bank's own hesitation about investment strategies.²⁶ Not surprisingly, poverty rates are highest in the agricultural sector. Families are generally bigger, wages lower, and living conditions substandard compared to their urban counterparts, especially those in Jakarta. In several reports the concern is about the social and political consequences of fostering a large and generally poor underemployed population (Indonesia's population is now the world's fourth-largest). And, of course, the economics of development strategy are closely tied to this. The Suharto regime, mindful of any IMF or World Bank attempts to influence the internal politics of the state, generally followed the advice of these reports and the examples of other Asian "miracle" economies like Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea by drawing surplus labor into other segments of production. But industrialization has raised not only real wages but the specters of class division on the one hand, and environmental disaster on the other (the latter has included the deliberate setting of massive forest fires but also an explosion of urban blight). Both now threaten to drive transnationals away, but in the early years of the New Order these considerations were distant, to say the least.

Indeed, it is tempting to say that Indonesia garners importance not because it makes shoes, but because it was made for shoes, which is of course merely to underline that transnational capitalism is not that interested in what Indonesia might otherwise "represent."²⁷ The political, social, and economic circumstances of Indonesia after 1965 increasingly made it ripe for exactly the mode of light industry, low-tech, labor-intensive "development" symbolized by shoe production. Yet this capitalist desire is simultaneously a masculinist desire, both a product of the search for higher profit margins in the process from production to consumption and a symptom of global fetishistic disavowal. The shoe stands in both for the desire that compels it and the actual conditions that inform it. This means not only the feminization of the developing world through the rubric of transnational market "penetration" (such language is not marginal but part of the very texture of the socioeconomic relations that accompany it); it also means that the internationalization of markets has attempted to efface the psychic inscriptions on the commodity form by exporting the nonrepresentation of the worker to the farthest corners of the globe (farthest, that is, from the object of the commodity's production – the consumer).

What starts out, then, as a conventional narrative about the onward march of late capitalist "development" in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in the thrall of TNCs becomes a web of complex synergy that the commodity presents as its natural apotheosis. To be sure, the roots of this process of commodification of relations on a world scale can be found in Marx's reading of industrialization, but there it was seen as the rallying point of a unifying labor movement conscious of the world that left it underfoot; now, however, it is the mark of amnesia and aphanisis – the great complexity of commerce that precedes the arrival of the commodity is repressed (disavowed). The commodity appears in its advertisement, and not in the hands of the shoemaker or rubber molder twelve thousand miles away. Naturally, a capitalist is taciturn about using the immiseration and inequality built into the production of the commodity as a way to sell it: That is one of the meanings of capitalism. But it is only now, in the transformed time/space relations of global capital, that criticism of this process seems beyond the powers of the cognitive. Even radical approaches to knowledge like cultural studies inadvertently buttress this point of view by concentrating on the subversive meanings of the consumer – what the consumer does with the commodity. The worker is either an old shoe or has disappeared, except as an ironic integer of her or his continuing absence from the realm of social, economic, and political power.

Again, a different sense of time/space critique does not solve that absence, as if a chronotopic

imagination alone might disarticulate the logical consistency of superexploitation. Yet the internationalization of cultural critique, with all its dangers, may be a necessary evil if one is to understand culture's implication in the order of things and thingness at this time. The story of Indonesia in the twentieth century was one of colonization, occupation, revolution, independence, counterrevolution, development, integration, and so forth. That it was also the *disjecta membra*, the refracting shards of Western capital and culture, is not a coincidence, however specific that narrative must be. That continues to be the real foundation of the chronotope of the shoe.

No shorthand version of Indonesian politics and economics will provide an adequate understanding of the tremendous changes wrought on society by the New Order's version of modern statehood.²⁸ The transmigration program of relocating large numbers of people to outlying islands in order to ease the burdens of population explosion in Java would itself serve as a case study of the disjunctions of Indonesian development (during and after colonization). And, of course, given the rapacious sway of transnational capital, some comparison with the business practices of the Dutch East India Company in the preceding centuries would also shed light on the differences in the extraction of surplus value from labor today.²⁹ From the above, three characteristics, however, have particular relevance to Indonesia's recent integration into the global economy: an excess of labor suitable for labor-intensive low-wage light-industrial production; little or no organized labor infrastructure; and an authoritarian regime that routinely disregarded the nominally democratic nature of Indonesian statehood epitomized in the five principles in order to smooth the flow of capital in and out of the country.

In terms of the Asian economic miracle since the end of World War II, this adds Indonesia to a metonymic chain that has included Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea. As transnationals move around Asia (and that obviously includes Asian transnationals, particularly those of Japan), competition for cost effectiveness has intensified. Interestingly, as the Asian markets seek out cheaper production costs, many of the companies who were subcontracted to boost production in places like Taiwan and South Korea are now subcontracting in other emerging economies. This is certainly true of Indonesia, and it appears to be the case in China, which is rapidly becoming the metonym to supplant all others in this process. Focusing on Indonesian shoe production is not meant to stand in unproblematically for developments of this kind elsewhere in the region, but rather it emphasizes what elements disrupt an otherwise tidy metonymy. In the end, it is not simply desire for cheaper labor in accordance with the appropriate prerequisites that produces these changes but also the logic of desire itself – that which does not favor mere cause and effect, but abstruse simultaneity.

The chronotope of the shoe can be schematized as a psychic compulsion linked simultaneously to gender hierarchization and commodity fetishism, a narrative that comprises the actual production of a shoe within regimes of capital, and a tale of the embodied labor of a shoe worker here interpellated in the Indonesian economy. The shoe is a particularly useful way to understand the chronotope of culture and capital because it accentuates the process of desire intrinsic to the logic of global circuits of production and consumption. The importance of the shoe relates simultaneously to its status as a commodity and to its function as fetish. In Freud's famous formulation, fetishism is a masculine prerogative – a reflex to the "horror of castration"³⁰ produced by the boy's belief in the woman (the mother) having a penis. The boy does not repress the contradictory evidence of this projection so much as disavow it (*Verleugnung*), a process that more properly describes the function of a fetish as an external reality. Why the shoe emerges as a fetishistic substitute for the "absent female phallus" is only hinted at in Freud's explanation: He avers that the young boy fixates on the shoe or the foot at the very moment of disavowal as the boy glimpses the woman's genitals from below. In the absence of the phallus the boy fantasizes its presence: The shoe, particularly the woman's shoe, becomes the metonym for something that it is not; namely, the belief that the Being of female is male.

More of a sketch than an essay, Freud's thoughts on fetishism have produced a plethora of interpretation. Indeed, recent discussion would seem to underline still further the importance and the controversy of this piece.³¹ The psychic significance of Freud's formulation is accentuated by its ambivalent relation to

its cognates in political economy, anthropology, and literary theory in which its critical function alternates between touchstone and gravestone. Marx preempts the Freudian turn to a certain extent by associating fetishism with the general aura of the object as a commodity. Behind what he refers to as the "hieroglyph" of the product lies value, which Marx explores as the social character of labor, precisely what the money-form's relationship to the commodity must erase or deny. In Freud's theory, the object arises as a presence for something that was never there; for Marx, the commodity stands in for a real absence, the social labor that produced it. In *Feminizing the Fetish*, Emily Apter explores a "curious compatibility" between these readings, a space where the commodity's "secret" and the "strangeness" of consciousness form (and here she quotes from Michel Leiris) an "affective ambivalence, that tender sphinx we nourish, more or less secretly, at our core."³² Apter persuasively theorizes ambivalence as a "third term," as the space where fetish, fetishism, and theories of fetishism ("the fetishism of fetishism") seem to mutually deconstruct – and is thus a place where "feminizing" becomes both necessary and ineluctable, as long as one limits its function to literary narrative (the textual examples that Apter provides). Whatever the ambivalence of Marx's own tropes on fetishism,³³ the "metaphysical subtleties" of the commodity do not stand in the same relation as Freud's fetishist to the fetish. Not quite.

Within commodity fetishism the social relations in exchange between commodities stand in for the social relations of those human beings who have labored to produce them. The illusory aspect of commodity fetishism is that the value of the commodity appears inherent to it, whereas its value is not natural, but social. This is a *real relation*, not simply a representational fallacy. One can easily accept Jean Baudrillard's exegesis of simulacra on this point,³⁴ but not the overhasty displacement of the economic onto the signifying chain for the very same reason. Thus, commodities can simulate one another without reference to an actual original (which never existed, hence the link to psychic fetishism), but labor value does not exist as an imaginary referent to the commodity even if it is presented as such. In addition, in the rush to find equivalence between Freudian "affect" and commodity effect it is easy to overlook that commodity fetishism is specific to the relations among things (that is, their exchange value), but fetishizing the shoe or foot is a displaced relation of subject and object, not two shoes' *danse macabre*.

If one links together the processes involved in the production and consumption of athletic shoes, several familiar patterns begin to emerge. To think these simultaneously within the chronotope is itself, as I have suggested, something close to fantasy (something hallucinogenic in Derrida's parlance), but is nevertheless the first circle of affective responsibility. Within production there is primarily a woman worker. She is hired because she is cheap and because she is dexterous (she has to be able to work inside and outside the shoe with great speed).³⁵ She is also assumed to be noncombative in terms of labor rights and, while unmarried, "free" to work long hours. With increasing unemployment on the land, the woman worker is lured from the village to the emerging urban centers in Indonesia. Nike moves to Indonesia from the middle of the 1980s at the same time that this labor force is itself emerging in the Indonesian economy. Light industry of this kind continues to be crucial for the Indonesian government in picking up the slack in industrial development caused by the reining in of its oil business in the international market. As noted, the World Bank played a large role in this "retooling," and some \$350 million of foreign aid poured into Indonesia over three years in the late 1980s for light industry development, including shoe factories (DK 185). In 1988 Indonesian athletic shoe exports stood at \$4 million, but by 1993 this had risen to \$1.5 billion. For Nike, the switch to production in Indonesia becomes more attractive at this time both because of almost nonexistent government oversight in their form of business and because labor costs in South Korea and Taiwan in particular were beginning to eat into profit margins. Since Indonesia was seen to lack a sufficient managerial class, Nike encouraged the importation of managers from other parts of its Asian operations – a move that often caused friction with the Indonesian workforce (including strikes and the destruction of facilities). In 1991, for instance, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported a woman line worker for Nike in Indonesia protesting that "They [the Korean managers] yell at us when we don't make production quotas and if we talk back they cut our wages" (DK 172).³⁶ While working conditions for women workers have improved, athletic shoe production is still a harmful and exploitative business. The

solvents used to glue the soles of these shoes are highly toxic and, even when the extractor fans are working well, the women constantly breathe fumes. Interestingly, the cofounder of Nike, Bill Bowerman, often made shoe prototypes using similar glue solvents and was eventually crippled by them. He developed neuropathy, a degenerative nerve condition often experienced by shoe and hatmakers. Nike opens and closes factories with such speed in its search for cheap labor that its workers are probably spared most of the long-term effects of glue sniffing. But the neuropathy remains in transnational exploitation itself.

To be sure, Nike's labor practices in Asia are unremarkable for late capitalist transnationalism.³⁷ Subcontractors scour emerging economies for the usual characteristics mentioned above and sufficient infrastructure to get raw materials in and the finished product out within the requisite business cycles. Some of Nike's shoe lines require more skill than others. (Air Jordans, for instance, were still made in South Korea at the Tae Gurang Industrial Company's factory called "T2" long after most of the other production lines had been shifted to Indonesia and China.) In the main, however, the price of the shoe is connected fundamentally to its image much more than the cost of the skill required to make it. Where the artwork, Van Gogh's shoe paintings for instance, might evoke the product-being of a whole community, the image of the athletic shoe provides a status in excess of the performance provided by the shoe's design. Nevertheless, the truth in *pointure* shares much of the epistemological form of the truth in advertising where shoes are concerned. To maintain the responsibility at issue one must continually reconnect these elements of the shoe's aura; that is, the sheer weight of marketing mystique with the object of superexploitation in the developing world, the woman worker.

The condition of women workers in Indonesia is overdetermined by several interlocking factors that facilitate the Nike "miracle." Among those mentioned so far, the nature of the government is vital. Despite the violent resistance to the newly restrictive Pancasila from the moment it was drafted into law in 1984 (which resulted in the Tanjung Priok massacre of protestors by the New Order in September of that year), in general the fate of women in the workforce is guided by the Pancasila's democratic absolutism. Women must know their place as wives and mothers but, when interpellated by the dictates of light industrial need, they must further submit to paternalism in the workplace.³⁸ Although this does not completely negate the possibility of industrial action (as mentioned, there have been significant strikes against Nike in Indonesia) it minimizes the risk by making protest appear against the foundations of continuing Indonesian nationhood. This limit on worker solidarity is not the monopoly of Indonesia; it is, rather, the unimaginable of contemporary regimes of time/space in capital. The limit always appears to emerge elsewhere.

One of these highly regulated women workers in Indonesia in the 1990s was Sadisah. In 1992 Jeffrey Ballinger, a labor activist who has done much to raise serious questions about Nike's Asian business practices, displayed one of her pay slips in *Harper's Magazine* to make visible, in an obvious way, the cost of Nike's business in the Asian market.³⁹ In April of that year Sadisah's wage was 14 cents per hour for a total of \$1.03 for a 7.5-hour day – significantly less than the government's figure for "minimum physical need." Sadisah, like the other 114 workers on her Nike line, was forced by material need to work long hours of overtime. Ballinger reports that an International Labor Organization survey found that 88 percent of women workers in Indonesia on Sadisah's wage were malnourished. Sadisah herself has come from a peasant community to make Nike's shoes and now can afford to rent a shack without electricity or running water. The cost of her labor to make one pair of Nike athletic shoes is about 12 cents. In the American market these shoes will sell for \$80 to \$150 a pair.

When Derrida writes of surplus value in his shoe essay he does not consider the maker, not even for a sentence, in the production of surplus value. To raise this specter (of Marx, and more besides) is not simply a question of restitution – to somehow claim or appropriate these shoes for their rightful owner, the shoemaker. Sadisah, on the contrary, remains with the shoe, in its stitching and gluing, just as the shoe stays with her, in her poverty and in her body (the effects of both the vapors, and long-term exposure to the purple lights that have often been used to illuminate the glue employed in the soling process). She exists in the shoe in a way that the capitalist cannot. Where the shoes in Van Gogh's painting leave a trace of the subject as owner, as user, the shoe itself is always already the embodied labor of its maker (yet without the

laborer's body). Air Max, Nike's most successful running shoe, illustrates the presence of this Being quite succinctly. The sole is see-through, like Cinderella's shoes, but here it is so that the consumer can see and show that "air is real," as one commentator puts it,⁴⁰ that you are indeed walking on compressed air. (It is no coincidence that Air Max is Nike's most fetishized shoe: The 1995 model, for instance, remains a collector's item.) There is the Being of Sadisah, there, where she is entirely absent, see-through, invisible. Her labor is to be walked upon because she is there, in her absence. Note, this is not a realistic representation of embodied labor, which must, necessarily, remain abstract. The Being of Sadisah is an abstraction; whereas "air is real" is an imaginary resolution of this real contradiction (to borrow from Althusser on ideology). But, occasionally, the shoe worker reminds the owner as consumer of her absent presence, for her pricking can chafe the foot, or the sole can burst, leaving the owner disconsolate but aware, briefly, that the air-to-be-seen was a product-being out of sight: the shoes had been made.⁴¹

In April 1992, Sadisah earned \$37 net for her month's labor. Ballinger, an AFLCIO researcher, notes an alarming disparity between this figure and that of the earnings of Michael Jordan at that time. Jordan, the linchpin of Air Jordan marketing, received \$20 million from Nike in 1992 for endorsing the shoe that bears his name. Ballinger calculates that it would take 44,492 years for Sadisah to earn this amount based on Nike's payments to her. The disparity lies in the power of the image, in the mystique of "branding," in the unfettered circulation of commodity culture. Yet opposition to the nefarious aspects of such circulation is not uncommon and, as it turns out, Nike has been one of the most prominent targets of transnational labor and consumer resistance. Ballinger's article represented something of a watershed in media awareness of the plight of women workers like Sadisah. Ballinger himself formed a group in 1994, Press for Change, that published a Nike Newsletter to expand public awareness in the United States of the real price of a pair of Nikes.⁴² The campaign against Nike intensified both because of labor action in the workplace and a concomitant media activism where Nike least expected it. Jose Ramos Horta, an East Timorese Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1996, encouraged and emboldened American labor and human-rights organizations to get involved in protesting rights abuses in Indonesia (not just in East Timor, but on islands like Java, where Nike's interests were extensive). Global Exchange took up the challenge and, with Press for Change, brought a Nike worker to the United States in 1996 on a consciousness-raising tour. While presence does not simply reverse the logic of aphanisis I have invoked, it remains a forceful answer to the conveniently missing worker in transnational corporate discourse. Cich Sukaesih had been fired by a Nike subcontractor in Indonesia in 1992 for organizing workers like Sadisah to press for at least Indonesia's minimum wage (about \$1.30 a day at that time). In *Reclaiming America*, Randy Shaw recounts the highlights of Sukaesih's American tour. Sukaesih arrived in Washington, D.C., during a fashion industry forum (in which she was not allowed to participate).⁴³ She had her photograph taken with Kathie Lee Gifford, perhaps America's most famous "reformed" sweatshopper, and also visited a Footlocker store to try on the Nike shoes she made but could not afford to wear. In New York, Sukaesih joined a protest outside a Nike Town (one of the company's superstores) and in Chicago requested a meeting with Michael Jordan, who, predictably, was unavailable. Sukaesih even made a visit to Nike's corporate headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon (another example, according to Phil Knight, of labor activists' "terrorist tactics"). Nobody from management would meet with her or Medea Benjamin of Global Exchange, a PR snafu that only served to intensify media coverage of the tour. Despite a well-oiled image machine, Nike was faced with the same quandary as the philosophers: the question of Being changes dramatically once the shoemaker is acknowledged.⁴⁴

This acknowledgment goes beyond the pious liberal reflex to wear a supportive badge and shoes with a different product label. Newer anti-sweatshop organizations and more established NGOs have built a sustainable human/worker-rights network, despite corporate attempts to buy out such entities in order to shore up their transnational image (Nike, for instance, has promised almost \$8 million over a five-year period to one such organization, Global Alliance). In general, the athletic shoe industry is dominated by the empty gesture of voluntary compliance or codes of conduct that lack enforcement procedures. Workers are less isolated, however, than they were a decade ago, and consumer awareness may yet produce the

affective responsibility at issue here in a global imaginary. Indeed, the prospects of a more transnational dialogism have been considerably enhanced not just by having a shoe worker testify in consumer markets, but by having NGOs and individuals work on the ground precisely in those areas disavowed in the past. In late August 2000, for instance, Jim Keady, an American former soccer pro, worked in a Nike shoe factory in the suburbs of Jakarta in order to publicize Nike's continuing reliance on paltry wages. The \$1.20 he received each day for his labor was not enough to keep him nourished and he fell ill from the ordeal. Responding to Keady's personal campaign, Nike said he had "trivialized and demeaned the lives of Indonesians who work in factories. . . . Given his privileged, Western perspective, Mr. Keady does not understand . . . the value and importance of a job . . . in Indonesia."⁴⁵

Mindful that even Keady's firsthand experience does not do justice to the complexities of corporate culture, let us focus briefly on Beaverton itself, the epicenter of Nike's "global imagery" and a "corporate Xanadu," as Katz calls it. "Nike World Campus" is a key node in the geopolitical imaginary of the chronotope. Of Nike's more than six thousand American workers, most are based in Beaverton. It is an extraordinary think tank devoted to the magic of the commodity form, to the marketing of image. For instance, in the mid-1980s Nike was big but had not yet become a transnational "player" like McDonald's or Coca-Cola. Then, in 1984, the company signed Michael Jordan to its roster and there began a marketing partnership that would give Jordan name recognition beyond belief and Nike global brand power. Consider the "Jordan Flight" television commercial developed at Beaverton in 1985. As Jordan glides toward the basketball rim the soundtrack emphasizes the roar of jet engines. The image is slowed down to enhance the fact that Jordan is in flight; indeed, he stays in the air for ten seconds. This human impossibility is precisely the point: Jordan has become the equivalent of the goddess whose name graces the ad. He can fly. Just before his retirement in 1993 (he has since made a comeback, retired again, and made another comeback), Jordan noted, "What Phil [Knight] and Nike have done is turn me into a dream." Here there is a bizarre correlation with the immiseration of Sadisah and Sukaesih somewhere offscreen in the shoe factory, as if the hyperreality of Jordan's flight is inseparable from the phantom in Air that the worker represents in Nike's sole. It is only in Beaverton, where Adam Smith's old invisible hand is still at work, that these complementary components must be kept apart, unlaced and unglued.

The Nike World Campus at Beaverton is a world removed from the factories in Indonesia. Responding to Katz's questions, Nike employees said the Campus was "like being in a playground" and that it was "a factory for fun" (DK 49). The workforce is young (but not as young as the women workers in Asia) and often display a highly motivated sports mentality.⁴⁶ The corporate identity of Nike is predominantly white and male even if the sportspeople who endorse its products are not. (Buildings are named after Nike success stories like Alberto Salazar, Bo Jackson, and Joan Benoit Samuelson.) While this is unremarkable for American capitalism it cannot be separated from the implications of Nike's global sway. The interior walls of each building are drenched with sports paraphernalia and associated imagery (Katz compares them to frat houses). This, however, goes beyond the trappings of jock culture: It is part of the very fabric of corporate life that makes up Nike's "matrix" structure. To read book-length studies of Nike like *Swoosh* and *Just Do It* is to understand that transnational corporatism itself depends on a working logic that is thoroughly masculinist. The activities at Nike management retreats (called "Buttfaces"), corporate parties ("Nike Nites"), and the annual Nike "Beer Relays" are perhaps the most obvious symptoms of the Beaverton mindset. But the dominance of testosterone in Nike activities has still more glaring "high" points: for instance, in December 1979, when the company went public (and Phil Knight became wealthy to the tune of \$178 million) no women employees were offered stock in the company (even Carole Fields, onetime controller for Nike and nicknamed "Dragon Lady," got nothing from the stock options). Similarly, even after the decision to move into the emerging and lucrative market for women's aerobic shoes in 1987 (and only after Reebok had profited handsomely from this line), it was several years before women were invited to "the boys' club in Beaverton" (as Katz calls it) to take a more active role in this marketing process (incidentally, this was a financial success, and by 1992 Nike was the leader in the aerobics niche⁴⁷). In the playground, however, the fun is mostly male and insistently so.

The matrix structure at Beaverton must acknowledge the material force of the Asian women workers even as the images it creates are the material reality that denies this link beyond the World Campus. While "exposing the technology" might allow one to "see the air," it also belies the stark contradiction and dependence between two material forces of production, the physicality in the fetishism if you will. Both aspects are integral to the time/space coordinates of the shoe. They are, in Bakhtin's terms, "the knots of narrative that are continually tied and untied" in an apparently empty continuum. Inside the World Campus, the designers, consciously or not, wrestle with the implications of this ineluctable link. Although they all have a "license to dream,"⁴⁸ the designers must work with the contractors and subcontractors to render their imagination profitable.⁴⁹ The cost of the material components is one consideration, and Nike has, over the years, developed a highly integrated system for bringing together materials made in different parts of the globe. The production of air pockets or sacs, the air that can be seen, is not trusted to the Asian market: the heart of Nike's "technology" is produced in the United States by a company called "Tetra," then shipped to Asia for assembly in the shoe itself. Lightweight leather substitutes like Durabuck are made by a Japanese affiliate. (Nike came up with Durabuck while its lab technicians were working on Michael Keaton's Batboots for *Batman*.) And the designers must also take note of regional variations in color tastes around the globe even though preferences among youth culture often change at rates that are out of sync with the production process. Of course, Nike advocates a high degree of homogenization (a mainstay of economies of scale), something facilitated by the power of the brand, but augments its "branding" with what it calls a "psychographic" view of the marketplace. When Nike designers are indulging in "free association," they are also targeting particular psychic profiles. This is one of the ways that masculinism (and other logics of Being) gets built into the shoe.

Cultural critics find the hard-edged rationalism of marketing anathema to cultural understanding, and yet it seems to me we seriously misapprehend the cultural logic of capital by suppressing the realities of corporate culture while celebrating somewhat traditional symptoms of art in the marketplace. What the Nike psychographic approach attempts is a breakdown of market segmentation in any one production cycle. This is represented as a triangle whose apex is dominated by Nike's leading profile target: the sixteen- to twenty-six-year-old "hardbody" male "sports driver." The fetishistic impulses of this group sets the standards for the rest (including the women's segments). These young males (again, the primary market is in the United States, but global sales continue to expand) will shell out the \$80-\$170 for "top of the line" models (even this last word is in step with the overall logic). This segment is designated "Max," although it is not reserved solely for the Air Max line. The next segment is called "Perf" (performance) and targets athletes and aspiring athletes who might actually gain from the design technologies in the shoe. Beneath this is the "Core" segment, which is also called the middle or "kill" zone where Nike makes most of its sales. The Core identify with Perf and Max yet usually lack both the body and the psychological investment to make as much use of Nike's high-profile shoes. Eighty percent of Nike's shoes are not used for their intended purpose. (Nike always contests this figure, but gradually and grudgingly "fashion" has pushed aside "athletic" in the symbolic of the shoe that Nike presents.) At the base of the Nike psychographic triangle is the "Entry" segment, those people who must be weaned onto Nikes by an incessant combination of peer-driven, price-driven, and advertising-driven campaigns. While brand loyalty is difficult in the ephemeral life of an athletic shoe (Max, for instance, may choose another line precisely because Core and Entry are choosing theirs), the psychographic approach is also beholden to the paradox of commodity fetishism in general: The consumer must be made to sustain his or her private fantasy even though he or she covets an object or image that is traded publicly. The savvy theorist has an answer to this dilemma, but then so too do Nike's marketing gurus, like Jim Riswold, who says of the psychography: "it never appeared to me as part of some grand strategy. I mean, it's not nineteenth century philosophy" (DK 151). Quite. Commodity desire gets a lot more help than Marx (or Freud for that matter) could envisage. The magic of the fetish requires the magic of money. In 1997, for example, Nike spent \$975 million on promotion.

Most of Nike's shoe lines play to and reinforce conventional definitions of masculinity. Just as the Greeks used Nike to symbolize victory in war (at one point they clipped her wings to keep "victory" in

Athens), so Nike laces the sports profile with the language of aggression. Featured shoe models have included Air Assault, Air Barrage, Air Force, Air Magnum Force, Air Raid, and even Air Stab. Other companies in the business have marketed shoes like "Run 'N' Gun," "Predator," "Marauder," "Shooter," and "Slasher." (It is noticeable that with the increased focus on every aspect of sneaker production the politics of naming has retreated to the relatively safe havens of cliché, abstraction or technobabble – Air Pegasus, Air Current RW, or Air Accel Low.) The association of sport and violence is not surprising, but it has other repercussions along the chain of affective responsibility than the epistemic violence that produces the superexploitation of Asian women workers. Before considering that in more detail, let us consider the design process of a typical Nike shoe.

For instance, the Air Carnivore was first dreamed up by Bill Worthington in 1992 and remains in many ways an archetypal lesson in Nike's creative logic. The path from idea to actual shoe is a laborious one: out of curiosity Nike employees once sketched out the process of a shoe's development, and the resulting map, cognitive or otherwise, was sixty feet long. Even then, the designer is weighed down by doubt. Worthington muses, "The question now was whether the consumer would be able to appreciate the technology inside the shoe, or to understand its true personality" (DK 159). This is something of my own approach in stressing the chronotope of the shoe. Worthington, however, stops short in his assessment of Air Carnivore's time/space coordinates: "People will tell each other about the Carnivore. They'll say, 'Here's a shoe that represents the aggression of sports'" (DK 159). The aggression takes on another meaning in Pusan, South Korea, where the Carnivores were made. The Carnivores would be one of factory T3's last production runs in 1993 as Nike moved still more production to Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. The name of the shoe is a fitting metaphor for Nike's labor practices: by the end of 1993, 3,500 T3 workers, mostly women, had been laid off. The graffiti on the factory walls included the demand: "We want to be compensated for working our brains out!" (DK 165) They were not.

Meanwhile back in Beaverton, a price structure was worked out for the shoe. Before they were fired (or disavowed in my schema), the T3 workers were paid about \$4.50 for every pair of Carnivores made. (This labor cost was considered too high alongside the margins available from workers like Sadisah and Sukaesih elsewhere in Asia.) Nike paid the subcontractor about \$29.50 for each pair of Carnivores (60 percent of the price went to product materials). "Landing" the shoe in the consumer market would take another \$7.40 (including duties). After taxes and another \$15 for running the operation at Nike World Campus, the company would have a \$5.50 profit built into the shoe. The retailer would pay about \$70 for the Carnivore, the consumer up to \$60 more than that depending upon demand and promotions (if the line becomes coveted, the price can soar – a little retail hoarding can exacerbate this effect, as it did with the infamous Air Max '95 whose margins expanded by up to 40 percent). While the women in Pusan look for employment in the emerging service industries, Nike will chase "nations farther down the developmental ladder" (DK 168) – places where a \$130 pair of sneakers can still be made, not worn.⁵⁰

The Air Carnivore looks like it could eat jobs and dollars as fast as it creates them. It is predominantly green (when first pitched at an annual sporting goods show in Atlanta the Nike salesperson barked "Vegetarians beware") and appears to abjure the natural contours of a foot. The bulkiness of the shoe is an illusion, since the synthetic materials used render it quite light. The sole is purple and black, and deeply striated into "pods" of supporting rubber. The upper of the shoe is deformed by several straps of Velcro which, like the advertising images, hold the shoe together around the foot. These straps are part of an "anti-inversion" collar which is both heavily indebted to technobabble and to a desire to prevent the ankle from turning should this cross-trainer actually be used for cross-training. The top of the shoe is dominated by a third Velcro strap which sticks, rather than stitches, the subject in the shoe (to complicate the metaphor so heavily analyzed by Derrida and the series of allusions I have made thus far). The inside of the shoe sports a Neoprene sock. This "Dynamic Fit Sleeve" allows the foot to move and breath inside a shoe whose outside suggests completely the opposite – anti-inversion indeed. We are far removed from Van Gogh's peasant shoes here, but other peasants are not completely erased: in the belly of the Air Carnivore a tiny label testifies "Made in South Korea."

The belly of a shoe? Worthington, the designer, is unequivocal: "This shoe is like an animal. It's like a living, breathing thing instead of an inanimate consumer product" (DK 127). Just as the Greeks anthropomorphized a symbol of military success, so our young designer gives life to the fetish of his desire. And what inspired this fearful symmetry? Worthington, like other Nike designers, is a self-professed "culture pirate" and, unlike most others at the World Campus, the designers often draw their imagery from outside the world of sports. The Air Carnivore owed its animal nature as much to the films *Jurassic Park* and the *Alien* series as it did to man's "natural" aggression (when Katz interviewed Worthington, the latter's office featured stills from *Alien*). Worthington also drew up a cartoon character to "image" the shoe's effect on its owner. An average kid, "Bert Starkweather," becomes "Bolt Stingwater" (Luke Skywalker?) in his Carnivores and proceeds to "win drag races on foot and step on people's faces" (DK 128). Could it be that this creativity never leaves the shoe, but becomes part of its affective image, its commodity aura, its product-being?

Obviously, the suggestion is not that merely by buying into the image one becomes the character that the designer projects but, nevertheless, if the main point of such consumption is not in fact the practical utilization of sporting technology for sport, then how the shoe is made and marketed stands in for (and contradicts) a corporate claim that is otherwise "ethically neutral." In contemporary capitalism, the violence of representation is also, and always already, the violence of production and consumption. To separate off the moment and malevolence of Image from the Being in production and consumption is to collude with precisely those avatars of this epoch who claim that image is everything and representation is, in itself, the sole arbiter of debates about the mode of production in and outside culture. The chronotope of the shoe suggests that the time and space of athletic shoe production across the globe curve toward simultaneity but in fact maintain context-specific criteria that appear to render them incommensurable. The inside/outside of commodity production, like the inside/outside of the shoe itself, is indeed inseparable, but how easy has it become to reduce the sign of worker presence/absence in production to a label tucked away from view? Two examples may elaborate the cycle of violence that is endemic to the production and circulation of commodities at the moment when fetishism must disavow its responsibility to the real, and indeed, to Reality.

Nike is taking greater control over its production and distribution operations in Asia as a result of the bad press it has received about the labor practices it fosters. (The Code of Conduct it trumpets still sidesteps the question of independent verification, but there is no doubt that Nike has been forced to reveal more detail about its day-to-day operations in Asia — it has even printed the addresses of some of the factories where it subcontracts.) Yet responsibility is a very relative state of mind in Nike's corporate ideology, since when accused of crass exploitation of its Asian workers Nike's spokespeople continue to maintain a dogged moral neutrality. This line of argument proposes that either problems occur because of the nature of the market or that Nike can hardly be held responsible for the internal socioeconomic (and political) conditions of the countries where it bases its production operations. The record, as I have already implied, underlines that Nike, like many TNCs, actively seeks and supports conditions of this kind. In addition, a program Nike describes as "Futures" exacerbates poor labor relations because, by securing future orders from retailers six to eight months in advance, the tendency is to speed up production quotas in Asia and reduce flexibility in the hours of work on the line. Other spinoff practices within this mode of production include the nightly confinement of young women workers to the dormitories within the factory grounds.⁵¹ The apex of these violations is, of course, the wage itself, and here violence begets violence. In Serang, near Jakarta, in 1992 Nike workers went on strike and demanded a 15 percent pay increase. While this may sound excessive to some, in fact it amounts to only 24 cents a day at 1992 exchange rates. When the local subcontractor, a South Korean, refused to bargain, the women workers smashed windows at the factory and overturned furniture. Rather than jeopardize the production cycle, the owner caved in.⁵² But, as the Korean workers in Pusan testify, workers take a risk with such activity: Nike can "just do it" elsewhere. In the five years leading up to this strike the company had closed twenty of its Asian factories and opened another thirty-five. And anyway, the TNC can say that any industrial action is the result of the contractors' malfeasance, not the company that pulls their strings.

But if the violence of production has material effects on workers like Sadiisah, then there is a concomitant violence in the culture of consumption that accompanies it. Nike's psychographic approach to the market has had another valence in the symbolic of the shoe: for American inner-city youth racked by unemployment and the lure of drug culture, the athletic shoe offers *status*. Again, the athletic shoe company will claim that the imaging of a particular desire is not an endorsement of its consequences, which are, in the first place, overdetermined by a host of other causal factors. But when Nike's cofounder William Bowerman proclaims that one should "play by the rules, but be ferocious" the difficulty is believing that the second emotion can be contained by the civic duty of the first. Nike themselves have not "played by the rules" to the extent that (according to *Swoosh*) they have used bribery in the past, kited checks, "dumped" inventory, and avoided custom duties.⁵³ And, if Nike's labor practices are anything to go by, the rule in athletic shoe production is that there are no rules, at least none that need strict compliance. One reason the slogan "Just do it!" is so enticing is surely that it imagines a world bereft of rules, a world in which "being ferocious" is some Darwinian compulsion. Do we really believe that the slogan "Just do it by the rules" would have the same effect in the competitive frenzy that is the athletic shoe market? And even if the desire to win in athletic competition can be characterized as "ferocious," is that the same desire communicated in such Nike models as "Air Stab" and "Air Carnivore"? The goddess of victory is smiling.

In 1989 Michael Eugene Thomas was strangled to death by his friend David Martin for his \$115 pair of Air Jordans. The same year Johnny Bates was shot to death for his Air Jordans, and Raheem Wells was murdered for his Nikes. In Chicago in 1990 there were, on average, fifteen violent crimes committed per month over athletic shoes (up to fifty a month if one includes warm-up jackets and other sports-related garments).⁵⁴ Jordan and Spike Lee have been singled out in the past for their Nike advertising campaigns of the late 1980s in which "Just do it!" became a street knowledge that dovetails with the "ferocious" reality of urban crime. In their defense, Nike played the race card by suggesting that it was typical of race bias in the media that African Americans were being blamed for contributing to the violence already heaped at the doorstep of low-income African American communities. To the extent that white celebrities are not routinely singled out for their contributions to cultures of violence (dozens of Hollywood names immediately come to mind), Nike's point is well taken, but the company's race relations contain their own history of bias. As we have seen, while Michael Jordan made \$20 million a year for footwear endorsements, Nike's predominantly white American marketing managers pitted Asian workers against one another (Korean versus Indonesian, Indonesian versus Chinese) in a game of wages tag in which the only defining qualities of racial esteem are the profit margins that accrue to their location. In the United States, Operation PUSH, the Chicago-based civil-rights group, mounted a campaign against Nike because of its poor record in minority hiring in the United States and because of its failure to provide support in the communities where a disproportionate amount of Nike products are sold (disproportionate in terms of income to sales, not total sales). PUSH also discovered that, at the time, Nike had no African American executives and did not use a single African American-run company to promote its products. Nike was cashing in on the image of African American athletes while cashing out on any responsibility to African American communities in general.⁵⁵ Naturally, Nike's public-relations department has worked on these issues. (TNCs usually have philanthropic programs — which in some cases provide tax breaks — to ward off the accusation that they are in the business of economic exploitation.) Nevertheless, the larger issue remains whether a transnational corporation should be held accountable for the forms of identification with its "global power brand."

The fetish is a lure. Nike spends millions of dollars each year to cultivate an "emotional tie" (as Phil Knight describes it) to the athletic shoe but disavows this connection at the point where its psychography facilitates an irrational logic of possession. Yet this is intrinsic to the commodity form and does not resolve itself in fine-tuning an image attached (with Velcro) to it. To murder someone for their Nike shoes is irrational in the extreme but is symptomatic of, among other socioeconomic factors, the culture of possession in general. Van Gogh's shoes may well have symbolized the eclipse of valorized peasant communities (certainly this is Heidegger's belief), but the fetishistic overinvestment in the athletic shoe is no less significant: it conjures the madness and malevolence of a particular form of globalism that is itself

deracinating peasant communities in different parts of the world *simultaneously and in the same affective space*. In the chronotope of the shoe, pricking stitches Sadisah to Thomas: the maps must be redrawn continually to account for this time/space continuum.

Commodity fetishism is not the same as the psychological compulsion sketched by Freud, but the centrifugal aura of the athletic shoe within contemporary transnational capitalism shows how one may be dialogically implicated with the other. Branding accentuates this overlap in the psychic and economic coordinates of the newest World Order — a relationship that is crucial to athletic shoe culture. Violence, epistemic and real, is not an accidental by-product of the matrix of contemporary commodity production but is vital to it, while the “costs” of production and consumption are necessarily rendered invisible or inconsequential. For Nike, the desire to expand sales far outweighs the use-value of their athletic shoes. In 1993, 77 percent of American young men said they wanted a pair of Nikes (even if they could not afford to buy them); some knew more than a dozen of the models available that year; others even knew the stock numbers. In the “teenager to young adult male” bracket, Americans owned more than ten pairs of sporting footwear *each*. In 1997, 350 million pairs of athletic shoes were sold in the American market alone (although increases in sales have slowed and, in some markets, have actually shrunk).

Michael Haines has a Nike obsession. When interviewed by Katz he had already collected almost forty pairs. Interestingly, his “fetish” (as his mother calls it) began in the early 1980s when he first spotted the see-through air sole of the Air Max. His desire, piqued by the appearance of absence, became at one point almost uncontrollable — he was forced to hide new pairs around the house and, when that aroused suspicion, he persuaded his father to buy them instead. Most of the shoes have never been worn and are revered almost solely for their associative effects. To read what Haines has to say about his shoes is to face the superaddressee of commodity production: “They have to face backward on the shelf because they’re so much more . . . beautiful from behind”; “if I could have a new pair every day”; “I still love to come home during school breaks and come up here to open the doors” [of the cupboard that houses his collection]; “I love them. I love thinking about opening the box for the first time. I love taking them out. Just talking about them gets me . . . I don’t know” (DK 262–63). The sexual dynamic of Haines’s attachment may be exaggerated and frankly bizarre, but few CEOs in the athletic shoe business would be upset by a desire directly connected to a company’s advertising machine. How much commodity desire is enough desire? Can this be calibrated, or is the love of these shoes incalculable such that the violence of the sweatshop and the street is an inadvertent by-product for which responsibility is an empty concept? Nike does not merely satisfy a need for athletic footwear, it deliberately creates a need far in excess of what is necessary (this, of course, is one of the meanings of capitalism). Yet conventional wisdom would have it that Haines hurts no one by coveting his shoes. In truth, his personal fixation has been purchased and in that exchange his desire is globally localized (to borrow once more from contemporary TNC lore) just as Sukaesih and Sadisah’s labor has been interpellated in an international network of capital exchange. The names and the products may change, but as long as the logic of these connections remains predominantly unimagined, then the commodity fetish will continue to be naturalized: the ontology of the commodity, the Being of the shoe, will present itself as a normative Being of culture. And what seems like an adjunct to cultural discourse is in fact what silently defines it.

Sadisah does not speak to us in these pages, and neither does Sukaesih (even through reported speech).⁵⁶ The shoes don’t speak either (although, on this point, the Nike designers are close to the philosophy of art proposed by Heidegger, Jameson, and Derrida⁵⁷). Even by acknowledging Sukaesih’s presence in the United States and foregrounding the immense, and generally successful, campaigns to defamiliarize the governing tenets of global sneaker production, this record does not undo the cognitive fix in “Just Do It!” The athletic shoe will pass out of TNC production exploitation not because people will stop running but because the “victory” invoked is not about running.⁵⁸ Indeed, the chronotope of the shoe is only about the essence of the shoe at all to the extent that such a commodity is a narrative about the international division of labor. Similarly, Indonesia is not miraculously mapped (even as it is integrated into global circuits of commodity production and exchange) by the affective points of time and space that I have

sketched above (and no handy reference to shadow theater will wrest it from that chiaroscuro). Shoe production does not give us the magic key to the intense vicissitudes of Indonesian history since independence. All I argue here is that the athletic shoe industry has inscribed itself in a particular form of nation building that is nevertheless uninterested in the Subject that such a process confers. To imagine the links in the aura of the shoe is what must be risked if criticism is to be responsibly positioned in global analysis. For the commodity, the chronotope becomes something of a heuristic device, “the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied,” but a place that is always displaced by the logic of desire in the marketplace and by the desire for a logic that is not stitched by authoritarian regimes of truth. The imagination required is less surefooted not only because the product-being of the contemporary commodity is dispersed fantastically, but because there is no language adequate to the global representation of the worker. While Nike has global imagery, there is yet no global imaginary that can transform the developmental ladder that the TNC typically exploits. So even when activists counter corporate tokenism by organizing independent labor watchdogs like the Workers Rights Consortium, there remains a tremendously powerful ideological machine that says such efforts are blind to the good that economic exploitation brings. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, for instance, blithely contend that sweatshops are the economic linchpin of Asian modernization. (“They’re dirty and dangerous. They’re also the major reason Asia is back on track.”)⁵⁹ In the nineteenth century, a similar paucity of global imagination allowed the British to believe that the opium trade was performing the same miracle. If antisweatshop organizations head off the descent into cynicism, smugness, and glibness, the structural logic of commodity production and consumption weighs heavily on counterhegemonic discourse. Indeed, merely by detailing the deaths that result from a psychic overinvestment in the commodity, one does not break the production of desire that informs it. What then, is the point of chronotopic critique?

I have borrowed chronotope from Bakhtin as he borrowed it from Ukhtomsky (and, indeed, Einstein), “as a metaphor (almost, but not entirely)”⁶⁰ to draw together seemingly disparate elements of the world system attached (artists, workers, philosophers, inner-city youth, and cultural critics alike) by affective responsibility. We have no alibi for this responsibility (the boycott of selected consumer items is ultimately beside the point) because, as Bakhtin reminds us, we cannot claim to be anywhere else but where we are in Being. Cultural criticism must do much more than express concern for the wasted humanity of capitalist production (a somewhat sentimental, humanist answerability) by making the deracinated Being of the commodity form imaginable. But this responsibility is also about meaning, which Bakhtin suggests can only become part of our social experience when it takes on “the form of a sign.” The shoe is not perhaps the “hieroglyph” that Bakhtin had in mind and that is partly why his formulation has been refigured in my argument by the “hieroglyph” that Marx identified. Just as our philosophers overlook the maker, so Bakhtin’s hypostatization of the novel placed formal limits on the range of social experience imaginable. That the novel can conjure the world of commodity culture is undeniable; the test of a geopolitical imaginary is whether it can imagine how the commodity can conjure in the opposite direction. This is not ultimately about the cognitive abilities of the cultural critic (or his or her humanist inclinations) but, more importantly, about forms of collective reciprocity disrupting the aura of the commodity that anxiously purports to embrace a world economy with its own cultural transnationalism. This kind of answerability does not exclude individualist efforts like Keady’s to dramatize the human costs of globalizing capitalist consumer desire, since he evokes a responsibility that can catalyze collectivity across borders. To imagine the world otherwise continues to be the challenge, not by individual volition, however, but by alternative forms of socialization. Only then will the shoe be on the other foot.

Notes

- 1 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1976), 163.
- 2 The main reason for this is primarily the shoe’s contradictory status within and between commodity fetishism.

- and its psychosocial cognates. This is a huge and separate debate in its own right, and one that dances among the lines that follow. For a wideranging and suggestive collection in this regard, see Emily Apter and William Pietz, eds., *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). Appropriately, the cover of this book features a pair of shoes bound tightly together – it's an illustration by Mary Kelly entitled "Supplication."
- 3 Here I allude to Jacques Derrida's reading of Martin Heidegger in "Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing [pointure]," in *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McCleod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). In general, I use Lacan's interpretation of Jones on aphanisis to underline the difference between the meaning that is ascribed to the commodity and the "disappearance" of the labor that marks its very possibility. The "fading" of the worker as subject is a function of her relationship to the commodity form under capitalism.
 - 4 The geopolitical imagination eschews the totalizing impulse of the dialectic at the same time as it resists the aestheticizing tendencies of the dialogic. If this imagination is indeed "representable," the commodity under transnational capitalism is its most prescient instance.
 - 5 Part of this reevaluation is manifest in the work of William Pietz, particularly in a series of articles entitled "The Problem of the Fetish" published in *Res: A Journal of Aesthetics and Anthropology* 9 (Spring 1985): 12–13, 13 (Spring 1987): 23–45, and 16 (Autumn 1988): 105–23, and in his essay "Fetishism and Materialism" in *Fetishism As Cultural Discourse*, ed. William Pietz and Emily Apter (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 119–51. I must say, however, that Pietz's general rejection of what he characterizes as "semiological" readings of Marx on fetishism seriously underestimates the significance of the imagination and the imaginary in commodity desire. The affective responsibility I explore is predicated on a materialist approach to semiosis.
 - 6 This, of course, is not how Bakhtin uses *responsibility*, which, in his early essays at least, is a means to foreground an ethical responsibility in aesthetics that is often antagonistic to the neo-Kantian Marburg school from which Bakhtin nevertheless drew sustenance. For Bakhtin's sense of responsibility ("answerability"), see his *Art and Answerability*, trans. Vadim Liapunov, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). What I will attempt to do with both Bakhtinian answerability and chronotope is reinscribe them within an economy of difference that does not resolve itself in an aesthetic "ought." The globalization of commodity culture answers traditional notions of authoring with the magic of the fetish: It "speaks" to them. But it also marks out new territories of practical engagement for the academic, for whom responsibility cannot remain an "academic" inquiry. For this sense of responsibility, see, for instance, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Responsibility," *boundary 2* (Fall 1994): 19–64.
 - 7 See Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes towards a Historical Poetics," in *The Dialogic Imagination*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 84–258. The chronotope has engendered intense disputes among Bakhtinians. My effort here is to accentuate its spatial possibilities in the critique of the commodity form.
 - 8 See Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World* (London: Routledge, 1990), 108–25.
 - 9 Bakhtin, "Forms of Time," 253.
 - 10 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 278.
 - 11 Bakhtin, "Forms of Time," 280.
 - 12 Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism; or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991).
 - 13 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.
 - 14 The culture of sport is very big business in the United States: even in the early 1990s it already represented a market of more than \$60 billion.
 - 15 Donald Katz, *Just Do It: The Nike Spirit in the Corporate World* (New York: Random House, 1994), 9. Subsequent references to this work will be included in the main text as DK plus page number.
 - 16 In addition to the book by Katz, Nike has been eulogized and criticized in J. B. Strasser and Laurie Becklund, *Swoosh: The Unauthorized Story of Nike and the Men Who Played There* (New York: Harper, 1993). The "swoosh" is Nike's trademark – vaguely reminiscent of the goddess's wing but more evocative of a secret diacritic. Such is the brand recognition of Nike that it can market all manner of shoes and clothing merely by adding the "swoosh."
 - 17 These figures are reported in Andrew Hsiao, "Standing Up to the Swoosh," *Village Voice*, 10 October 2000, 41–43.
 - 18 See Hsiao, "Standing Up to the Swoosh."
 - 19 This, therefore, is not a humanist response to the inhumanity of the commodity for the worker. In *Capital*, vol. 1, Marx is quite explicit about the twofold character of embodied labor in the commodity and its connection to the socialization of consciousness. The issue of embodied labor must be kept separate from that of the worker as commodity, or as an exploitable cost of production.
 - 20 Nike also makes/has made athletic shoes in South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and China. These countries may be interchangeable for transnational capital but they are not for this argument.
 - 21 See Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory* (London: Verso, 1992), 97. A further problem, as Ahmad well knows, is that even if one focuses one's critique in relation to a national paradigm, the necessary expertise calls into question the globalism of the critique itself, and not just the blithe country hopping of the TNC. The answerability of theory is bound by a cognitive shortfall, one that prescribes and denatures even the most ardent openness to global others.
 - 22 The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's role in this is still hotly debated (it was clearly involved in the civil war of the 1950s), as are the consequences for American foreign policy in the aftermath of the genocide that swept Indonesia at that time (the estimates of murdered PKI members, sympathizers, and anti-Suharto supporters of all persuasions range from 250,000 to one million). By 1967 Sukarno's power was effectively nullified and opposition to Suharto had either "disappeared" or was languishing in prison (in the late 1960s Indonesia could boast more than 100,000 political prisoners). A critical account of the coup is provided in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and R. T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). A useful, if general, reading of the period can be found in Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia* (London: Longman, 1995).
 - 23 We are still too close to the events of 1998–99 in East Timor to gauge the success of East Timorese independence. At that time, the Indonesian military and its sponsored thugs, usually termed "militia," officially withdrew from East Timor and a UN peace-keeping contingent led by Australia took up positions in Dili, the capital, and elsewhere. Little, if any, mention was made of Western, particularly American, machinations in the invasion of 1975 (or, for instance, the military and economic support provided by Australia to Suharto's regime afterward). Indeed, the international community has trodden gingerly over the issue of Indonesian violence in the region in order to maintain its sinuous ties to Indonesia's far more important geopolitical economy. Again, this schema of desire and disavowal (with its attendant diplomatic amnesia) is deeply embedded in the logic of globalization. For a polemical critique of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, see Matthew Jardine, *East Timor: Genocide in Paradise* (Tucson, Ariz.: Odonian Press, 1995).
 - 24 To borrow from Benedict Anderson's famous formulation, the Pancasila are about as good an example of how communities get "imagined" as one could find (the principles are belief in God, national unity, humanitarianism, people's sovereignty, and social justice and prosperity). Sukarno kept them sufficiently vague to smooth over the obvious divisions that racked the Indonesian archipelago in the aftermath of colonization. If the geopolitical imagination merely replays the deficiencies of the imagined community epitomized in the Pancasila, then it must fail as an adequate critical apparatus.
 - 25 See, for instance, D. Chercichovsky and O. E. Meesook, *Poverty in Indonesia: A Profile* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984); and C. Iluch, *Indonesia: Wages and Employment* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1985).
 - 26 Consider the World Bank monograph *Indonesia: Strategy for a Sustained Reduction in Poverty* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990). The World Bank reports that in 1987 30 million Indonesians lived in poverty (17 percent of the population at that time). Indonesia had one of the lowest per capita incomes, lowest life expectancy, and lowest number of doctors per capita in the world (1 doctor for 9,460 people). The World Bank recommends that, because of the limited feasibility of expanding Indonesia's rice farming, the country embark on a course of light industrial, labor-intensive manufacturing. Several years (and millions of Nike shoes) later, the World Bank reports (in *Indonesia: Environment and Development* [Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994]), that the problem is overindustrialization from the expansion and inclusion of the workforce in manufacturing (by the end of the decade, this represented 45 percent of Indonesia's GDP). The World Bank asks where Indonesia is going to get the foreign capital to sustain such an industrial workforce and wonders at the same time whether the severe pollution (particularly on Java) is a catastrophe waiting to happen. Income, life expectancy, and the number of doctors have all improved, but these reports reveal that the World Bank, foreign governments, and foreign

- corporations have all played a part in exacerbating underlying systemic problems in Indonesia. The effects of greater pollution, for instance, and indeed of industrialization in general, may well lower life expectancy in the years to come. While there is little rigidity to developmental models in Asia, the experience of urban centers like Jakarta and Taipei might give the World Bank some pause about the prospects of Beijing or Shanghai.
- 27 Unless the selling of a representation itself is at stake. While there is no space here to detail the intricacies of "cultural diplomacy," it is clear that the Indonesian government has attempted in the past to sell an image of the nation that provides a cultural compensation for its otherwise authoritarian operations – and that foreign governments and corporations are, entirely complicit with this process (since to overlook a massacre or two might garner economic preferences). See, for instance, Clifford Geertz's trenchant assessment of the "Festival of Indonesia" in the United States in 1991 in "The Year of Living Culturally," *New Republic*, 21 October 1991, 30–36; and Brian Wallis, "Selling Nations," *Art in America* 79 (September 1991): 85–91.
- 28 One of the best English-language studies is provided by Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). See also J. D. Legge, *Indonesia* (Sydney: Prentice Hall of Australia, 1980); and Leslie Palmier, ed., *Understanding Indonesia* (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1985).
- 29 For instance, the infamous *Cultuurstelsel*, or Forced Cultivation System (which basically paid for the Netherlands' debts, costs of war, and public works programs in Holland from 1830 to 1869), is an object lesson in colonial excess and modes of labor exploitation in Indonesia.
- 30 Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism," trans. Joan Riviere, in vol. 21 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth, 1961), 154.
- 31 Most of the innovative work in this area does not just take issue with the normative function that Freud provides for this "minor perversion" but unpicks the model of masculinity it seems to imply. This includes feminist appropriations and renegotiations that, while not necessarily complementary, have "feminized the fetish" in significant ways. See, for instance, Donald Kuspit, "The Modern Fetish," *Artforum*, October 1988, 132–40, in which he argues that some contemporary women artists fetishistically mimic the phallic mother in order to attach the power of birth to the creation of their objects. Researching the *aliénistes* (as the nineteenth-century French psychiatrists often called themselves), Jann Matlock reinterprets the phenomenon of women as clothing fetishists in "Delirious Disguises, Perverse Masquerades, and the Ghostly Female Fetishist," *Grand Street* (Summer 1995): 157–71. In a highly original reading of fetishism's economic and psychic interrelations, Linda Williams explores how ambivalent phallicism can structure even the conventional masculinist narratives of hardcore pornography in "Fetishism and the Visual Pleasure of Hard Core: Marx, Freud, and the 'Money Shot,'" *Quarterly Review of Film and Video* 11, no. 2 (1989): 23–42.
- 32 Emily Apter, *Feminizing the Fetish* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2.
- 33 And these are many, especially as they slide into and contradict Marx's metaphors for ideology. For a provocative reading of the function of metaphor for Marx's concepts, see W. J. T. Mitchell, *Iconography: Image, Text, Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). While not subscribing to a Marxist position, Mitchell is careful to distinguish the tactical, historical deployment of metaphors in Marx's arguments. What can and cannot be seen in the commodity fetish remains vital to the present polemic but as an indication of a continuing dissymmetry between visualization and imagination.
- 34 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983).
- 35 Indeed, the proletarianization of Asian women emphasizes either dexterity or eyesight and often both. For a keen analysis of the treatment of women workers under transnational capitalism, see Annette Fuentes and Barbara Ehrenreich, *Women in the Global Factory* (Boston: South End Press, 1983).
- 36 The disciplinary zeal of the managers is reinforced by the ideological underpinnings of the Pancasila, which encourage dutiful submission and *ibuisim*, the belief that a woman should primarily act as a mother without demanding power or prestige in return. Clearly, women workers have resisted every element of this desire, despite the threat of wage cuts or dismissal.
- 37 Yet the higher Nike's profile, the more vocal the resistance against such business practices has become. For capitalist investors, however, Nike is an exemplary organization. In 1993 *Money* magazine included Nike in a list of six American companies who offered investors returns of up to 47 percent per annum. See Ellen Stark, "Making Money on America's Top Money," *Money*, June 1993, 114–17.
- 38 The conservative reinterpretation of the Pancasila as a document that supports patriarchy is detailed in Cribb and Brown, *Modern Indonesia*. For an important essay on the enlistment of young peasant women into the Indonesian industrial workforce, see Diane L. Wolf, "Linking Women's Labor with the Global Economy: Factory Workers and Their Families in Rural Java," in *Women Workers and Global Restructuring*, ed. Kathryn Ward (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 25–47. In *Factory Daughters* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) Wolf has written one of the most extensive and detailed analyses of the effect of globalization on Javanese women workers. For some pertinent discussion of the cultural representations of the effects of the Pancasila for women, see Tineke Hellwig, *In the Shadow of Change: Images of Women in Indonesian Literature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
- 39 See Jeffrey Ballinger, "The New Free Trade Heel," *Harper's Magazine*, August 1992, 46–47. In 1993 Ballinger appeared in a special edition of "Street Stories" on CBS that focused on Nike's operations in Indonesia. Ironically, the main factory featured was about the cleanest shoe manufacturing plant on the planet. Nevertheless, the program reported that a strike at another Indonesian plant had resulted in twenty-two workers being "suspended," and it did document the practice of confining the women workers to the plant dormitories. Katz (*Just Do It*) provides plenty of details on this and other evidence of Nike's misdeeds in Asia, but his critique remains a long way from condemnation.
- 40 Quoted in Strasser and Becklund, *Swoosh*, 501.
- 41 It also reminds the business community of Nike's economic vulnerability. Michael Janofsky, for instance, recalls the misfortune of Quincy Watt, the American runner, whose Nike shoes came apart during a race at the world track and field championships in Stuttgart in August 1993. Watt, an Olympic champion, finished fourth. Janofsky uses this as an occasion to discuss a quarter in which Nike's earnings dropped. He suggests that "Just Do It" be amended to "Just Glue It." See Michael Janofsky, "Market Place," *New York Times*, 24 September 1993, D6.
- 42 Much of Ballinger's activism on Nike in Indonesia is recorded in Jeff Ballinger and Claes Olsson, eds., *Behind the Swoosh: The Struggle of Indonesians Making Nike Shoes* (Uppsala: Global Publications Foundation, 1997).
- 43 Shaw's book provides a fairly detailed chapter on the human- and labor-rights campaigns directed at Nike in the 1990s as part of a general argument on new forms of activism in the United States. See Randy Shaw, *Reclaiming America: Nike, Clean Air, and the New National Activism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
- 44 This is a subtext that runs through the collection *No Sweat*, ed. Andrew Ross (New York: Verso, 1997). The campaign against sweatshop practices in the United States has achieved numerous victories, but, as Ross points out, eradicating the worst excesses of the fashion industry does not remove the tyranny of substandard wages as a whole in clothing and shoe production. And, given the sharp mobility of contemporary transnational corporations, continued vigilance must be maintained to ensure that subcontracting does not simply reproduce sweatshop conditions in a new location. The latter is a major reason for a company to go global in the first place.
- 45 See Hsiao, "Standing Up to the Swoosh," 43.
- 46 For more on the cultlike campus at Beaverton, see James Servin, "Camp Nike: It's Not a Job, It's a Lifestyle," *Harper's Bazaar*, June 1994, 46–48. In another odd twist in economic history, a psychology professor suggests that the model for the Nike World Campus was the athletic sports camps provided in Eastern Europe under Communism!
- 47 See Kate Bednarski, "Convincing Male Managers to Target Women Customers," *Working Woman*, June 1993, 23–24, 28. Not surprisingly, the language of this article is generally in step with capitalist consciousness. There is no recognition, for instance, that Nike had been "targeting" women workers for quite some time. In effect, the women managers disavow the women workers just like their male counterparts, although that is not the same as saying that a woman's identification with the shoe is simply the equivalent of male fetishism; it is to acknowledge, however, that male fetishism is hegemonic. For an article that reconnects the woman as producer to woman as consumer, see Cynthia Enloe, "The Globetrotting Sneaker," *Ms.*, March–April 1995, 10–15. For more on this form of global critique, see Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
- 48 Katz (*Just Do It*, 130) describes a process of invention at Nike World Campus that is indistinguishable from artistic reverie and is nurtured "in a general ambience of youthful, free-associative creativity that is invariably tempered by some flavor of sophisticated wit."
- 49 On this point, labor is the deciding factor: "No matter how inspired a new technical design, style statement, or marketing campaign, the entire industry's productive processes were still based on how fast the women in Pusan, South Korea, and Indonesia could glue together by hand up to twenty-five pieces of a single shoe" (*ibid.*, 174).

- 50 Vietnam and Bangladesh are more recent additions to this game.
- 51 The factory dormitories are widespread, but this has been a particular feature of Nike's Chinese operations. The retort has been that this is for "security reasons" and has nothing to do with the fear that the workers might become romantically involved, want to start families, or even choose another line of work.
- 52 See Mark Clifford, "Spring in Their Step," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 November 1992, 56–57. The title refers to Nike's practice of hopping from one Asian country to the next in search of cheap labor.
- 53 None of this is particularly surprising for a capitalist organization. Nike's annual reports detail several other practices that may or may not abide by the rules of risk management for capital. The company uses both derivatives and hedging as financial instruments, both of which are subject to greater extremes of volatility than are most accounting practices. Interestingly, in fiscal 1997, Nike issued about \$300 million of debt securities, the proceeds from which were swapped into Dutch guilders, ostensibly to smooth the financing of European operations. Since the company also hedges using currency contracts, it might be interesting to trace the life of these guilders. Obviously, that the Dutch were the primary colonial force in Indonesia is an irony easily missed by Nike's accountants.
- 54 For more on the culture of killing for sportswear, see Rick Telander, "Senseless," *Sports Illustrated*, 14 May 1990, 36–49. See also Katz, *Just Do It*, 268–70. On Tuesday, 19 December 1995, in New York a man went berserk in a shoe store after being told that the Nike hightops he had ordered had not yet arrived. He pulled out a 9mm pistol and shot dead five people. The man had been previously diagnosed with schizophrenia. While Nike cannot be blamed for individual acts of madness like this, a culture of active responsibility does not resolve itself in the mere fact of diagnosis.
- 55 See, for instance, Wiley M. Woodward, "It's More Than Just the Shoes," *Black Enterprise*, November 1990, 17.
- 56 My point here is simply that such speech does not constitute the truth of the commodity, not that testimony is irrelevant.
- 57 Heidegger, "Origin of the Work of Art," 161, claims the Van Gogh painting "spoke" the Being of the thing, the product-being in the shoes. Jameson's comment that Warhol's "Diamond-Dust Shoes" "doesn't really speak to us at all" implies that Van Gogh's effort does (Jameson, *Postmodernism*, p. 8). And Derrida's entire investigation is about how the truth "speaks" in painting. Derrida suggests that Heidegger makes the peasant shoes "speak" — once they are painted, "these shoes talk" (Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McCleod [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], p. 323). My point is that these figures of speech are written into the product-being of commodity fetishism.
- 58 Indeed, the rise in popularity of rugged "outdoor" shoes and boots has already redrawn the athletic shoe market. Nike, of course, has switched production accordingly and expanded its focus on apparel. It also experimented with another slogan, "I can," which carries enough existential baggage to rewrite this chronotope again.
- 59 Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, "Two Cheers for Sweatshops," *New York Times Magazine*, 24 September 2000, 70–71.
- 60 Bakhtin, "Forms of Time," 84.

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