In front of me, on the desk where I write, I've assembled a bunch of instruments useful in measuring the environment, instruments that I've found around the house. In front of me, on the desk where I write, I've assembled a tape measure, a yardstick, a stopwatch, a watch, a goniometer and an arm protractor, a clinometer, a map measure, a compass, a wall thermometer, a pocket thermometer, a percentage protractor, a level, a plumb, a light meter, a camera, a pocket scale, a postage scale, a barometer, a measuring cup, a set of measuring spoons, a pedometer, a stud finder, and a passel of questionnaires. Some of them, like the pedometer, no longer work, but still I hold on to them. Others, like a couple of the questionnaires, never worked at all, but even these I am loathe to throw away. All of them have told me, or promised to tell me, something about my world, and since the world is something I'm eager to know about, I'm not eager to part with these instruments, functioning, flawed, or broken down. It's 84º F where I sit at 11:30:36 in the morning. It's nine minutes and forty-seven seconds since I typed the first word in this paragraph.

There's another instrument in this room and I am it. I would have said it was stuffy where I sit and that half an hour had passed since I started writing, although my stop watch now says it's been eleven minutes and thirty-eight seconds at, according to my other watch, 11:34 on the nose. I won't argue with my instruments. They're measuring different things than I. My thermometer knows nothing of the humidity oppressing me; my watches, recording the pressure of their drive springs, know nothing of the pressure of trying to say something with words.

Who should say which is superior instrumentation? Not I, certainly. My watches and I, we're holding up the world against different standards, but both of these are interesting and valuable and important. Fifty years ago a couple of sciences emerged that used humans as instruments for learning about the environment. If a science involves the study of the physical world and its manifestations (especially by using systematic observation and experiment), or is an activity that is the object of careful study, or that is carried out according to a developed method, then certainly psychogeography was a science.

Two Psychogeographies

As I say, there were two of these. The first, notoriously, was the psychogeography developed by the Lettrists, actually by members of the Lettrist International, some of whom would soon enough begin calling themselves Situationists. In fact, it was Guy Debord who introduced the idea — together with the name “psychogeography” — to refer to “some provisional terrains of observation, including the observation of certain processes of chance and predictability in the streets.” In his 1955 paper, “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,” Debord argued that, “Psychogeography could set for itself the study of the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals.”

Ten years later, wholly unaware of Situationist psychogeography, the psychologist Robert J. Beck and the geographer Gilbert F. White, both then at the University of Chicago, used the term in a grant proposal for studying something similar. In 1966, White's colleague, the geographer Robert W. Kates, and the psychologist, Joachim Wohlwill, both at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts (where Beck would soon come to teach), edited a special issue of The Journal of Social Issues devoted to “Man's Response to the Physical Environment.” In 1967, the psychologist David Stea, by then also at Clark, offered what was undoubtedly the first university course in psychogeography. Cross-listed as Psychology 207 and Geography 207, it was formally called “Behavioral Science and the Environment,” and said “psychography” on the syllabus; but it was universally known as, and soon formally called, psychogeography. The following year, Ingrid Hansen sat for the world's first master's comprehensive in psychogeography. For five years the field flourished, producing a number of theses and dissertations, but it fairly rapidly mutated into environmental psychology, environmental cognition, environmental modeling, participatory design, and other splinters. A faculty seminar that it spawned, soon enough a faculty-student seminar, was responsible for launching the radical geography journal Antipode.
**Situationist Psychogeography**

Despite their manifold divergences, and sharply different forms of generalization, the Situationist and Clark psychogeographies had a common interest in the city. Debord’s introduction of psychogeography occurred in his “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,” after all; and one of the Situationists’ founding texts – which called for life as a continuous dérive (literally drift) – was Ivan Chtcheglov’s “Formulary for a New Urbanism.”

The dérive was the essential psychogeographic method. As defined in the inaugural issue of the *Internationale Situationniste*, the dérive was “A mode of experimental behavior linked to the condition of urban society; a technique of transient passage through varied ambiances.” Situationists used “ambiance” to refer to the feeling or mood associated with a place, to its character, tone, or to the effect or appeal it might have; but they also used it to refer to the place itself, especially to the small, neighborhood-sized chunks of the city they called unités d’ambiance or unities of ambiance, parts of the city with an especially powerful urban atmosphere. But ambiances could also be fleeting as Debord acknowledged in the following passage:

> The sudden change of ambiance in a street within the space of a few meters; the evident division of a city into zones of distinct psychic atmospheres; the path of least resistance which is automatically followed in aimless strolls (and which has no relation to the physical contour of the ground); the appealing or repelling character of certain places – all this seems to be neglected.

The Situationists’ objective was to employ the dérive to rectify this neglect by discovering unities of ambiance and in this way to establish a basis for reconstructing the city as a terrain of passion.

Debord wrote about the dérive at length in his “Theory of the Dérive” in the second issue of the *Internationale Situationniste*: “The dérive entails playful-constructive behavior and awareness of psychogeographical effects; which completely distinguishes it from the classical notions of the journey and the stroll.” The dérive’s antecedents, unhesitatingly acknowledged, included the Saturday night wanderings of Thomas De Quincey (“I used often, on Saturday nights, after I had taken opium, to wander forth, without much regarding the direction or the distance …”) and André Breton’s Surrealist romance, Nadja (“I don’t know why it should be precisely here that my feet take me, here that I almost invariably go without specific purpose, without anything to induce me but this obscure clue: namely that it (?) will happen here”).

But unlike the walks taken by De Quincey and Breton, the dérive was usually done in small groups: “One can dérive alone,” Debord acknowledged, “but all indications are that the most fruitful numerical arrangement consists of several small groups of two or three people who have reached the same awakening of consciousness, since the cross-checking of these different groups’ impressions makes it possible to arrive at objective conclusions.” For a limited time – the average duration of a dérive was a day – the members of these groups were to drop “their usual motives for movement and action, their relations, their work and leisure activities, and let themselves be drawn by attractions of the terrain.” Unlike the random walks taken by Surrealists, there was nothing random about a dérive: “From the dérive point of view cities have psychogeographical relief, with constant currents, fixed points and vortexes which strongly discourage entry into or exit from certain zones.” By letting themselves be drawn through the city by the city, the Situationists felt they could discover its unities of ambiance.

**Situationist Psychogeographic Maps**

Debord and his Situationist colleague, Asger Jorn, made two maps of Paris, the *Guide Psychogéographique de Paris* (1956) and *The Naked City* (1957). The *Guide* was subtitled *Discours sur les passions de l’amour*, below which it said, “pentes psychogéographiques de la dérive et localisation d’unités d’ambiance,” or, “psychogeographic slopes of the drift and the location of unities of ambiance.” The unities of ambiance appeared on the map as fragments of commercial street maps carefully cut out to indicate each unity’s defenses and exits. The psychogeographic slopes were symbolized by red arrows indicating the forces the city exerted on drifters freed from other motivations for moving: drifters would be pulled in the direction of the arrows from one unity of ambiance to another. The weight, shape, and patterning of the arrows indicated the lengths and strengths of the psychogeographic slopes.
The Naked City's subtitle read *Illustration de l'hypothèse des plaques tournantes en psychogeographique*. Plaques tournantes – literally hinges or railway turn-tables – were what Situationists called those unities of ambiance from which the city could pull one in many different directions; that is, *plaques tournantes* were unities of ambiance that functioned as psychogeographic switching stations. The old market at Les Halles was a plaque tournante. So was the old Plateau Beaubourg. Debord’s invocation of objectivity was not idle. If, as Simon Sadler says, “a sense of the wealth of information included in these maps dawns only slowly,” it is also true that:

… the infinite care with which they were cut implies that every street integral to each unity, and every street bordering it, was walked and considered … The plethora of arrows implied a massive number of permutations for drift, and Jorn and Debord’s wish to squeeze so much psychogeographic information onto the map may account for their decision to explode the fragments, freeing room on the paper. If Situationists spent as much time drifting as they claimed, then it is possible that all these permutations were tested. And the precision of the map was achieved only by some tough-mindedness about which streets were truly capable of transforming urban consciousness.²⁰

**Clark Psychogeography**

Unities of ambiance, drifting, psychogeography were, it is important to say, but facets of a Situationist revolution in everyday living, and Situationists generalized these ideas in Situationist directions.²¹ I have no wish to ignore or marginalize these, but here I am concerned with the parallels that emerged in Clark psychogeography ten years later and in its precursors at the very same time the Situationists were engaged in their experiments. Here I refer especially to the work of Kevin Lynch. In describing his long road to Clark, David Stea has insisted that his prime influence was Kevin Lynch: “My conversations with Lynch from 1964 to 1966,” Stea has written, “made me into a ‘cognitive mapper’ and encouraged me to pursue research on urban imagery while I was a Visiting Professor of Architecture at the National University of Mexico in 1966-67,” the year just before Stea came to Clark. At Clark, Stea introduced his psychogeography students to Lynch’s *Image of the City*, and for some this was decisive. I, for example, left for Mexico almost immediately after reading *Image of the City* where, in San Cristobal las Casas, I replicated what I could of Lynch’s work. I returned the following summer to expand the work into scales and modalities – auditory and olfactory – that Lynch hadn’t dealt with, and collected further “mental maps.” These turned into my master’s thesis, *Fleeting Glimpses*, which laid the ground for my doctoral dissertation, *I Don’t Want To, But I Will*, on how mental maps of London, Rome, and Paris evolved in American teenagers in their first experience of these cities. In 1971 Stea and I published *A Cognitive Atlas: Explorations into the Psychological Geography of Four Mexican Cities*, and we were far from alone in being affected this way by Lynch’s example.²²

Kevin Lynch was a city planner who taught at MIT from 1948 to 1978, though he continued to teach into the 1980s. Lynch was later to say that four motives informed his work on the image of the city: an interest in the connection between psychology and the urban environment; fascination with the aesthetics of the city at a time when most planners dismissed them as a “matter of taste”; wonder about how to evaluate a city; and a commitment to pay “more attention to those who live in a place – to the actual human experience of a city.”²³ In 1952 Lynch taught a seminar that, among other things, explored how people found their way around in cities, issues he continued to think about during an ensuing year of travel. In 1953 he pulled his thoughts together in the only recently published “Notes on City Satisfaction” that opens with, “We are concerned here with the psychological and sensual effects of the physical form of the city.”²⁴ In 1956 Lynch co-authored “Some Childhood Memories of the City,” which opened with the question, “What does a child notice in his city?”²⁵ In 1959 he co-authored “A Walk Around the Block,” and this opened as follows:

What does the ordinary individual perceive in his landscape? What makes the strongest impression on him and how does he react to it? In recent research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology we have recorded the impressions of people as they walked through the city streets. Other studies of urban perception have been made, but we believe this to be first where responses have been recorded while actually moving through the city itself.²⁶
The work was conducted as part of a project Lynch directed with Gyogy Kepes from 1954 through 1959 that was designed to unveil the elements in a city that were important in its perception.

Though Lynch and the people whose responses he recorded did walk around the city, they did not derive. In fact most of what Lynch learned came from a series of map-drawing and other tasks he set thirty residents of Boston, fifteen of Jersey City, and fifteen of Los Angeles. It was these studies he described in 1960 in *The Image of the City*, summarizing his results in a series of provocative maps that very rapidly became iconic. In part this was a tribute to the attractiveness of the maps themselves – as the attention paid the *Guide Psychogéographique* and *The Naked City* is in part a tribute to their attractiveness – but Lynch’s maps were also part of an effort to come to grips with the visual quality of American cities by studying the mental images of them held by their inhabitants, and the sense that these maps were in some way mental maps gave them an aural power that Lynch had surely never anticipated.

In addition to walking around the city, analyzing impressions, and mapping the results, Lynch paralleled the Situationists’ interest in unities of ambiance and the spaces among which they floated. In an appendix to *The Image of the City*, Lynch provided detailed analyses of the “highly identifiable district of Beacon Hill” – a unity of ambiance if ever there was one (whether it would have appealed to the Situationists or not) – and “the confusing node of Scollay Square” which Lynch’s respondents described as “shapeless, hard to visualize, [and] ‘just another crossing of streets’” (but which with its “‘low-class’ amusements” might have appealed to the Situationists). Lynch and his colleagues didn’t just walk these streets, they obsessively mapped them, producing maps of steep streets, street cross-sections, inset doorways, brick sidewalks, bow front windows, ornamental ironwork, and even the subdistricts of Beacon Hill, an analysis that surely would have spoken to Debord.

The year that Stea brought Lynch to Clark also saw the publication of David Lowenthal’s *Environmental Perception and Behavior,* which had just been republished in *Human Nature in Geography,* with its invocation of geosophy, the study of geographical knowledge from any and all points of view. This, Wright explained, “has to do in large degree with subjective conceptions. Indeed, even those parts of it that deal with scientific geography must reckon with human desires, motives, and prejudices.” It was time for geosophy, perception studies, and mental maps to fuse into psychogeography.

**Clark Psychogeographic Maps**

In the end psychogeography took in too much territory, and “mental maps” was where people tended to congregate. Contributory here was the publication in 1966 of Peter Gould’s paper, “On Mental Maps,” whose findings about the perception of residential desirability were displayed as contour lines on maps. For a moment in the late 1960s it seemed as though we could just slice heads open and inspect the maps lying there, despite the fact that the things we were calling mental maps ranged from the sketch maps we solicited from people; through maps like those of Lynch, Stea, and myself that summarized the content analysis of numbers of sketch maps; to maps like Gould’s which were no more than graphic displays of statistical analyses of rank-order lists people had made. None of this was wholly divorced from the interests of the Situationists who after all found in Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe’s urban social anthropology “examples of modern poetry, capable of provoking sharp emotional reactions,” and who imagined that “even Burgess’s theory of Chicago’s social activities as being distributed in distinct concentric zones, will undoubtedly prove useful in developing dérives.” But it was nevertheless very far from Situationist psychogeography.

Yet in some of the Clark work there were uncanny similarities to that of the Situationists. Trying to understand how mental maps developed, I accompanied a group of American teenage tourists on their first trip to Europe and got them to draw me maps of London, Rome, and Paris on successive days. Altogether I collected over three hundred maps from these kids. In my dissertation, *I Don’t Want To, But I Will,* I approached these maps from a variety of directions. I made Lynch-like maps of the places the kids put on their maps that allowed me to see how their knowledge changed with experience. I also studied...
what the kids knew about individual features—like the Thames, Tiber, and Seine—and how this too changed over time. I looked at the way the maps were organized, whether features floated around or were connected, and how connected they were. And I tried to understand something about the relationship between the kids’ ideas of the structures of London, Rome, and Paris, and the ideas of commercial mapmakers.

To do this last I gridded up a commercial map so that I could assign grid coordinates to every feature on each of the kids’ maps. If their maps were structured like the commercial maps, the grids I would get by connecting the coordinates on the kids’ maps would resemble the evenly spaced, right-angle grid I’d drawn over the commercial map. It was easy to see that the kids’ maps not only didn’t much resemble the commercial map, but that they varied widely among themselves. They also changed with experience, in most cases growing more like the commercial map. Looking at these grid transformations, as I called them, I had the feeling that I was looking at the very surface of the kids’ mental maps. And as Debord had, when contemplating the psychogeographic relief of Paris, I too reached for a topographic metaphor.

“The study of topography has developed an interesting and extensive vocabulary that we may borrow freely and apply to the study of mental map surfaces,” I wrote:

It is particularly relevant in a study such as this, which by virtue of collecting maps through time, is able to take a genetic viewpoint. The basic mental map/geomorphology analogy is quite rich. Thus novel experience may be compared with the tectonic activity of the earth’s crust, the effects of memory compared with the process of erosion, and many geomorphic features compared with many features of the mental map surface. Several proximate grid lines, the result of two environmentally distant features being placed next to one another, can be understood to represent a steep slope or cliff. Consideration of these grid lines as a perceptual or cognitive cliff gives us a handle on this phenomenon. It might be designated a p-cliff …

It thus became possible to say about the London maps that if the first set showed us a mental landscape characterized by geomorphic youth, that the last set showed us “a much older landscape, characterized by gentler slopes in the p-cliffs and a general movement toward a flat p-peneplain.”

**Situationist and Clark Psychogeographies**

Despite their similarities, my p-slopes and Debord’s psychogeographic slopes referred to different, if potentially related, aspects of urban experience. By letting themselves drift, the Situationists rolled down psychogeographic slopes of attraction from one unity of ambiance to another. By comparing the kids’ maps with maps one could buy in a store, my p-slopes became measures of confusion about the structure of the city, the p-slopes steepening with uncertainty. Debord and Jorn’s arrows tracked desirability, my contours plotted knowledge.

These differences can be generalized to those between Situationist and Clark psychogeography. To a certain extent, both sciences grew from a deep dissatisfaction with post-World War II urban planning practices. Situationists were implacably opposed to the reconstruction of Paris being carried out during the 1950s, and Situationist psychogeography constituted an alternative way of thinking about the city. But to the extent that Clark psychogeography is derived from Lynch’s work, it too represents an effort to describe another approach to thinking about the city. The obvious difference is in their situation, the Situationists outside the planning profession and so free to think about the problem as dictated by their roots in Surrealism and their commitment to dialectical materialism; Lynch within the profession, and so shackled to thinking through the problem from the perspective of city government with its grab-bag of service provision (especially of roads, sewer and water), condemnation, ordinances, and incentives.

Consequently Lynch focused his research on aspects of the city that could be shaped by city government. The controlling characteristics of people’s images that Lynch attended to were legibility and imageability, both of which government could shape, the first through the planning of roads and other macro-features of the city, the second through zoning ordinances and incentives. Understanding the public’s image of the city would enable planners to make the city both more imageable and legible, and this would make the city easier to negotiate and thus less intimidating and more friendly. Civic virtue should rise. This is a caricature of Lynch’s thought, and if it hardly dominated the work of Clark psychogeographers, it was nevertheless a persistent theme, not only in the on-going concern with
imageability and legibility, but in practice, Stea, for example, leaving Clark for the School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA, me for a career in the Department of Landscape Architecture in the School of Design at North Carolina State University. That is, whatever the orientation toward particular contemporary planning practices, Clark psychogeography was largely complicit with the idea of planning, and at best aimed at ameliorating some of its destructive consequences.

Situationists, on the other hand, aimed at nothing less than the collective takeover of the world and instead at ameliorating the situation, aimed at provoking its crisis on every occasion by every means. “The first of these means,” Debord wrote, “are undoubtedly the systematic provocative dissemination of a host of proposals tending to turn the whole of life into an exciting game,” and much of Situationist psychogeography had precisely this exciting character. As for urban planning, the Situationists regarded it, with aesthetics, “as a rather neglected branch of criminology,” “imposed by means of blackmail of utility,” where utility was the very last thing Situationist psychogeography had on its mind. As Simon Sadler has said: “Psychogeography directed us to obscure places, to elusive ambient effects and partial artistic and literary precedents for the sublime. If we felt frustrated at the effort required to put them all together, we had missed the point. Psychogeography was a reverie, a state of mind … It represented a drift from the ideal and the rational to the extraordinary and the revolutionary.” Except in the refuge corners, Clark psychogeography represented a march toward the ideal and the rational.

Yet despite this fundamental divergence the two psychogeographies were equally marked by seriousness of intent. Both elaborated methods that insured reproducible results and a remarkable degree of objectivity. And both sciences accepted, in fact celebrated, the necessity of using human beings to measure salient dimensions of the environment. Cities, they both seemed to take for granted, as human artifacts for human living needed human instruments to measure them. And if Situationist and Clark psychogeography measured different things, they both measured human things. None of the instruments on my desk could begin to measure even the components of utilities of ambiance and psychogeographic slope, of imageability and legibility. Only people wandering around cities could do these things, with their tape recorders and questionnaires, or just drifting, drifting.

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3 Ibid.
4 Personal communication, Robert J. Beck; but it’s embedded in a letter about the origins of psychogeography at Clark that I wrote Saul Cohen, November 23, 1971.
6 The questions on this exam – “What is the term ‘environmental?’” “What is meant by the ‘innate-acquired’ controversy among theorists and researchers on territoriality?” “It has been contended that the use of the term ‘environmental perception’ by geographers leads to confusion. What appears to you to be the distinction between ‘perception’ as used by psychologists and by geographers?”, and “What can you say about the possible role of language in environment-behavior relationships?” among others – continues to point to the dispersion of interests at this stage.
7 Among the theses were my Fleeting Glimpses: Adolescent and Other Images of that Entity Called San Cristobal las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico (1971), Roger Hart’s Aerial Geography: An Experiment in Elementary Education (1971), and Margaret Tindal’s The Home Range of Black Elementary School Children (1971), and among the dissertations, Borden Dent’s Perceptual Organization and Thematic Map Communication (1970) and my own I Don’t Want To, But I Will (1973), all of which were published by the Clark University Cartographic Laboratory.
8 According to David Stea’s memories as recounted in his, “Clark Remembered.” in the Special Clark University Issue, Journal of Environmental Psychology 7(4), December, 1987, pp. 379-388, with the memory on p. 380. Others remember this differently, or at a different time. All the articles in this issue are concerned with the work at Clark in the late-1960s and early 1970s.
9 Although “Formulary for a New Urbanism” first appeared in Internationale Situationniste #1, June, 1958, Chitchglov had drafted the text under the pseudonym Gilles Iain in 1953. Chitchglov was later to “repudiate the Formulary’s propaganda for a continual dérive,” remarking of the 1953-1954 dérive of three or four months that, “it’s a miracle it didn’t kill us” (in Ivan Chitchglov, “Letters from Afar,” in Internationale Situationniste #9, p. 38). Again the translation is Knabbs’s, op. cit., p. 372.
10 Internationale Situationniste #1, June, 1958. Again I’m quoting from the Knabbs translation, op. cit., p. 45.
11 Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography,” as translated by Knabbs, op. cit., p. 6. Ambiances could also change over the course of a day.
13 Thomas De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, Dover Publications, 1995 [1821], p. 41. De Quincey’s description of his walks, among the poor, and into veritable “terrae incognitae” that had not “yet been laid down in the modern charts of London,” is the high point of the Confessions.
14 Andre Breton, Nadja, Grove Press, New York, 1960 [1921], p. 32, as translated by Richard Howard. Forty-four photographs, largely of Parisian street scenes, added a dimension to the book that would have appealed to Debord who like most of the Situationists had little time for the Surrealists: “Everyone is the son of many fathers,” said Michele Bernstein, a Situationist and the wife of Debord. “There was the father we hated, which was surrealism. And there was the father we loved, which was dada. We were the children of both” (as quoted by Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 181).
15 All the quotations in this paragraph are from “Theory of the Dérive,” as translated by Knabbs, p. 50-51.
grey), and fuzzy. The best readily available reproduction of The Naked City: Illustration de l'hypothèse [sic] des plaques tournantes en psychogeographique [sic], 1957, is in Simon Sadler's essential, The Situationist City (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998), p. 60. Apparently The Naked City was bound into Jorn's Pour la forme (Internationale situationniste, Paris, 1958), although unbound sheets apparently also exist. At one time Debord promised three other psychogeographic maps: Paris sous la neige, The most dangerous game, and Axe d'exploration et échec dans la recherche d'un Grand Passage situationniste, but if he made them no one's ever seen them (see Sadler, footnote 48, p. 182, and David Finder, personal communication).

17 Though the maps were based on dérives, they were produced through the process of "détournement" ("the integration of past or present artistic production into a superior environmental construction") in which fragments of existing works are taken and rearranged or juxtaposed to produce new meanings.

18 According to Sadler (op. cit., p. 88), this is explained on the back of The Naked City where it says, "The arrows represent the slopes that naturally link the different unities of ambiance; that's to say the spontaneous tendencies for orientation of a subject who traverses that milieu without regard for practical considerations."

19 Ibid., p. 90.

20 Ibid., p. 88 and p. 89.

21 Thus the dérive, for example, potentially involves a lot more than drifting in search of unities of ambiance: "One can see virtually unlimited resources of this pastime," Debord wrote. "Thus a loose lifestyle and even certain amusements considered dubious that have always been enjoyed among our entourage - slipping by night into houses undergoing demolition, hitchhiking nonstop and without destination through Paris during a transportation strike in the name of adding to the confusion, wandering in subterranean catacombs forbidden to the public, etc. - are expressions of a more general sensibility which is nothing other than that of the dérive" (in "Theory of the Dérive," in the Knabb translation, op. cit., p. 53).


25 Kevin Lynch and Alvin Lukashok, "Some Childhood Memories of the City," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 22(3), 1956, pp. 144-152. This was frequently anthologized, most recently in Banerjee and Southworth, op. cit., pp. 154-173.

26 "Kevin Lynch and Malcolm Rilvin, "A Walk Around the Block," Landscape 8(3), pp. 24-34. This too has become an anthology piece. It's also included in Banerjee and Southworth, pp. 185-204.


29 This last was extracted from Donald Appleyard, Kevin Lynch, and John Myer, The View from the Road, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1964.


32 Though Arthur Krim, for example, continues the work in the geosophy that he brought to a high degree of polish in his doctoral dissertation, Imagery In Search of a City: The Geosophy of Los Angeles, 1921-1971, Clark University, 1980.


34 The remarks are Debord's from "Theory of the Dérive," in the Knabb translation, op. cit., p. 50, and refer to Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe's, Paris et l'agglomération parisienne, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1952. In later remarks, Raoul Vaneigem was far more hostile. See his "Comments Against Urbanism" in Paris et l'agglomération parisienne, except that all color in the images is rendered in black and white.


36 As it is said in "Preliminary Problems in Constructing a Situation," in Internationale Situationniste 1#1, in Knabb's translation, op. cit., p. 42.

37 From "Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography," op. cit., p. 6.


39 Ibid., op. cit., p. 76.